The rise of China: Competing or complementary to DAC aid flows in Africa? by Granath, Louise
 Department of Economics 
School of Business, Economics and Law at University of Gothenburg  
Vasagatan 1, PO Box 640, SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden  
+46 31 786 0000, +46 31 786 1326 (fax) 
www.handels.gu.se    info@handels.gu.se 
      
 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS 
 
 
No 671 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rise of China: 
Competing or complementary to DAC aid flows in 
Africa? 
 
Louise Granath 
 
 
 
September 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1403-2473 (print) 
ISSN 1403-2465 (online) 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement: I would like to thank Ann-Sofie Isaksson, Arne Bigsten, Sven Tengstam, Joseph 
Vecci and Måns Söderbom for valuable comments and suggestions.  
 
 
 
 
The rise of China: 
Competing or complementary to DAC aid flows in Africa? 
 
 
Louise Granath 
 
Abstract: This study investigates if the relationship between bilateral DAC aid and Chinese 
aid allocation is better described as competing aid flows, or if Chinese aid has been mainly a 
complement to DAC aid in Africa between the years 2000 and 2012. The relationship is 
analysed in a two-level framework, both cross-country and within countries at the sector level, 
where China is assumed to be responsive to established DAC aid allocation priorities. This 
study makes use of the most recent update of AidData’s unique dataset on Chinese Official 
Finance to Africa and the DAC aid data is extracted from the OECD Creditor Reporting System 
database. The results suggest a positive and statistically significant effect of DAC aid allocation 
with respect to Chinese aid allocation in the following year at the country level. The result is 
interpreted as a competition between China and DAC to serve the same recipient countries with 
aid. A similar, or any, relationship between DAC and Chinese aid allocation at the sector level 
within recipient countries is however not confirmed.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 21st century the foreign development assistance provided by 
emerging donors has increased sharply in both absolute and relative terms (Manning, 2006; 
Woods, 2008; Dreher et al., 2011; Walz & Ramachandran, 2011; Tierney, 2014).  China is 
suggestively the most important non-member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), and in the forefront of 
this group of emerging donors. In particular, China’s engagement as a donor in Africa is 
growing, but the knowledge about China’s motives and the aims of its aid commitments as well 
as the actual aid allocation is still limited (Strange et al., 2013). Recent findings confirm that 
Chinese aid in Africa is channeled to most African countries and most sectors where also DAC 
aid is represented, this has induced a discussion about whether China will compete with or 
complement aid flows from the existing DAC donor community (Strange et al., 2013; 
Hernandez, 2015).  
It is only recently, owing to Strange and co-authors’ collection and publication of the first 
project-level database on Chinese aid to African countries between year 2000 and 2013, that 
academic scholars are now able to run the first cross-country econometric allocation regressions 
on Chinese aid commitments. Since the first publication of the data in 2013, the database has 
been widely used by academic scholars, but so far, the relationship between Chinese aid and 
the traditional DAC donors’ spatial and sectoral aid allocation has received little attention in 
the literature. Knowledge about China’s allocation strategy and in particular China’s interest or 
disinterest to cooperate with the DAC community may have important policy implications for 
the ongoing debate about donor coordination and aid effectiveness. Aid fragmentation and lack 
of donor coordination are two confirmed sources of increasing transaction costs, unnecessary 
administrative burdens in recipient countries and in the end reduced aid effectiveness (Acharya 
et al., 2006; Anderson, 2011; Bigsten & Tengstam, 2015). The traditional DAC donor 
community is already struggling to improve on these issues and the emergence of an increasing 
number of “new”1 donors with China in the forefront may further complicate the coordination 
attempts if the motives and interests of China are contradictory to those of the DAC donors.  
In an attempt to address the coordination concerns about China’s increasing engagement 
in international aid activities, the aim of this study is to investigate whether the presence of 
bilateral DAC aid is taken into account in the Chinese aid allocation process, and hence 
                                                          
1 China’s foreign aid programs in Africa started already in the 1950s. The term “new” donors is commonly used 
to separate the increasingly active non-DAC donors from members of the traditional OECD DAC community 
(Woods, 2008).  
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investigate if the Chinese aid flows mainly compete with or complement established DAC aid 
allocation priorities. This study will try to identify the relationship between actual DAC aid 
allocation and Chinese aid allocation in Africa employing a two-level, cross-country and 
within-country sectoral framework and investigate whether the two aid sources are better 
described as either competing with each other over the same countries and sectors or if the aid 
flows have been mainly complementary to each other under the time period 2000-2012.  
By employing the database on Chinese aid by Strange et al. (2015a), this study contributes 
not only to the growing body of empirical literature on the determinants of Chinese aid 
allocation (see for example Dreher et al., 2015a; Dreher et al., 2015b; Li, 2015), but also with 
an examination of the relationship between bilateral DAC aid and Chinese aid in Africa. This 
study may be the first attempt to analyze the relationship in a framework proposing that a 
potentially systematic relationship between Chinese aid and DAC aid is driven by Chinese 
direct or indirect responsiveness to DAC aid allocation. Additionally, this study is probably the 
first to examine this relationship in a two-level analysis, both across and within aid recipient 
countries. In spite of the ongoing debate on the implications of the increasing Chinese aid flows 
to Africa, there are exceptionally few econometric studies on this topic. Hence, this study can 
hopefully contribute with new and interesting knowledge. Furthermore, the results can serve as 
informative input into the future discussion about what implications the increasing Chinese 
engagement as a donor in Africa might have for the traditional DAC donors’ coordination 
attempts, imposed conditionality requirements and fulfillment of the Paris Declaration and the 
Accra Agenda for Action. 
One of the few papers that has examined the relationship between Chinese and DAC aid 
cross-country allocation directly is a study by Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2011). The authors 
empirically test whether Chinese financial flows are directed towards countries that receive less 
aid from bilateral DAC donors and find a country-level negative and significant relationship 
between DAC aid and Chinese financial flows. Another paper Hernandez (2015), shows that 
the World Bank imposes significantly fewer conditions on aid recipient countries if Chinese 
ODA loans are present. The author’s interpretation is that the World Bank lessens its 
conditionality to cope with the excess supply of development resources and cross-country 
competition from China. 
In Hernandez (2015) the analysis is limited to a setting where the World Bank is reacting 
to the presence of Chinese ODA loan options. This current study does instead consider a model 
where China is assumed to be the responsive donor and respond to DAC’s aid allocation.  
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In the cross-country analysis of this study, three different measures of Chinese aid are 
employed as the dependent variable, and this study runs a binary choice model as well as 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models in the baseline empirical strategy. In the within-country 
sector analysis the baseline empirical strategy is again a binary choice model. The key 
explanatory variable of interest is bilateral DAC aid and numerous robustness checks are 
performed where the econometric model is altered, the country sample is restricted and 
alternative lags of the key explanatory variable are used. Additionally, a test for differences 
between countries concerning natural resource endowments, democracy, corruption prevalence, 
income and a division of observations into an early and late time period is performed at the 
country-level. Within countries, differences between sector categories are investigated.  
There are a number of reasons why the current study suggests that China is likely to be the 
more responsive donor of the two. First, China’s aid is frequently described as demand driven 
(see for example Dreher et al., 2015a), and China imposes no conditionality2 on aid recipients, 
which may suggest that China indirectly allocate aid to countries and sectors not eligible for 
DAC aid, or where DAC aid is not sufficient. Second, the literature suggest that China may not 
be motivated to integrate and coordinate aid efforts with the traditional donor community 
(Lancaster, 2007; Tierney, 2014; Dreher et al., 2015b). Third, information and data on DAC 
aid have been transparent and officially published since the beginning of the 21st century, while 
there are still today no disaggregated official figures on Chinese aid commitments. Chinese aid 
is typically negotiated by high level politicians and the process generally lacks transparency. 
Hence, it seems reasonable to expect that China is better informed about DAC aid strategies 
and allocation decisions, and in a better position to react on DAC aid allocation rather than the 
other way around.  
Still, the simultaneity issue is an aggravating factor for the empirical analysis and there are 
obvious reasons to suspect that reverse causality may be a source of endogeneity. It is, for 
example, not unlikely that the DAC donors are better informed about Chinese aid commitments 
and more flexible and responsive in their allocation decisions than assumed in the current study. 
To be able to credibly address the endogeneity concerns, this study would have to use an 
Instrumental Variable (IV)-strategy and instrument for DAC aid, but due to difficulties to find 
a valid instrument this study has instead introduce a lag to the DAC aid flows in a modest 
attempt to address the endogeneity concerns. 
                                                          
2 One exception is the recognition of the “One-China”-policy, i.e. recognition of the government in Beijing and 
not in Taipei, Taiwan, as the representative of China (Dreher et al., 2015b; Dreher & Fuchs 2016).   
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The main empirical finding is a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
DAC aid allocation and Chinese aid allocation at the country level. China does not seem to 
coordinate with the DAC donors when allocating its aid in Africa, and respond to increasing 
DAC aid in a competitive way with additional aid to the same countries. However, the empirical 
investigation for the within-country sectoral analysis cannot confirm any systematic  
relationship between DAC aid allocation and Chinese aid allocation.   
The rest of this study is structured as follows; section 2 provides a short background to 
Chinese aid management and the official statements (White Papers) on Chinese foreign aid 
programs. In section 3, the related qualitative and quantitative literature is reviewed. Section 4 
develops the theoretical framework and presents the research questions. Next, section 5 
describes the data sources, variables and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 6 presents 
the econometric specification and discusses the empirical strategy, robustness checks and 
heterogeneity tests. The main results and findings are presented in section 7, while section 8 
contains the analysis and discussion of the findings. Finally, section 9 concludes. 
2. Background to Chinese Foreign Aid  
This section provides a short introduction to China’s foreign aid management and presents some 
basic insights about differences between traditional DAC aid and Chinese aid characteristics. 
2.1 China’s Foreign Aid Management   
According to the State Council (2011), there are several different departments and ministries 
involved in the Chinese aid management system; two examples are the Ministry of Commerce 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Involved ministries are responsible for their own foreign 
aid projects and budgets, and the foreign aid plans are submitted on an annual basis to the 
Chinese State Council for approval. Chinese embassies and consulates play an important role 
in the Chinese aid management system; it is often the host government themselves that 
approaches the Chinese embassies in order to initiate aid programs and propose specific 
projects. In short, the host government’s proposal is submitted to the ministries in Beijing and 
thereafter a team of experts visits the host country for project feasibility assessment and budget 
negotiations. If the project is found to be feasible and attractive to fund, a final aid project 
proposal is prepared and submitted to the Chinese State Council for approval. Moreover, the 
Chinese embassies are also in charge of the coordination and management of approved foreign 
aid projects in recipient countries (State Council, 2011). Hence, the aid management and 
negotiation process involve mainly high level political officials and the process seems to lack 
transparency.  
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The most substantial part of China’s aid is provided through bilateral channels and Africa 
has been the continent receiving the largest share of Chinese aid. Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC), which was initiated in 2000, might be China’s most important 
multilateral platform for dialogue and cooperation with its diplomatic allies in Africa.  
However, since 2005, China has been participating also in cooperative projects with other 
donor countries and international organizations according to the State Council (2011).   
2.2 White Papers on Chinese Foreign Aid 
China has a tradition of issuing official White Papers declaring China’s stance to complex issues 
and to inform the public about China’s strategies. The only official figures on China’s foreign 
aid are presented in two government White Papers on China’s Foreign Aid, the first paper was 
published in 2011 followed by a second paper in 2014. These two documents elaborate on the 
Chinese stance on foreign aid and disclose some aggregated figures of the total volume of 
China’s foreign development assistance. The White Papers clearly state that China, unlike the 
western DAC donors, is not imposing any particular conditionality on their aid flows and affirm 
China’s well-known policy of “no strings attached”, i.e. that China does not make any attempts 
to intervene in internal political affairs in aid recipient countries. Furthermore, China 
acknowledges the aid recipient countries’ right to independently choose their own path of 
development and promises that Chinese aid is tailored to meet the actual needs in recipient 
countries (State Council, 2011; 2014). Table 1 present a short overview of some basic 
differences between traditional DAC aid and Chinese aid characteristics. 
Table 1. Overview of some basic differences between traditional DAC aid and Chinese aid 
Donor Receiving country 
eligibility 
Initiation and screening 
for aid projects 
Tying of aid   Transparency of  aid programs 
China  “No- Strings 
attached” -policy 
Often host country 
initiated aid programs – 
demand driven aid 
Usually tied aid to 
Chinese delivery - or 
imports of resources 
Low transparency and aid, i.e. ODA, 
often  mixed together with other 
types of financing 
DAC-members Often require some 
conditionality 
Aim to deliver well- 
coordinated and 
harmonized aid  
Today about 90 percent 
of DAC aid is untied 
Transparent and clearly defined what 
flows are counted as ODA 
Sources: See for example, Tan-Mullins et al. 2010; Walz & Ramachandran 2011; Berthélemy 2011; Bräutigam 2011; State Council 2011; 
2014; Lin & Wang 2014; Dreher et al 2015a. 
3. Related Empirical Literature 
The rise of China as a global aid donor has fostered both interest and skepticism about China’s 
motives. This resulted in an early body of qualitative literature that generally describes China 
as an aid donor driven by selfish motives such as securing natural resources rather than by 
development concerns, and a supporter of undemocratic and corrupt regimes (see for example 
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Tull, 2006; Mohan & Power, 2008; Woods, 2008; Vines et al., 2009; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010)3. 
Some scholars have even suggested that the unconditional nature of Chinese aid undermines 
the traditional donors’ effort to promote democracy and human rights (Woods, 2008;Tan-
Mullins et al., 2010). This early qualitative literature is important to review, since it is the origin 
of today’s conventional “wisdom” about Chinese aid. However, the results presented in this 
literature are typically anecdotal evidence from qualitative case-studies on an individual 
country basis and the findings may therefore be hard to generalize. 
Only very recently, the first econometric studies of the determinants of Chinese aid 
allocation have been published. Dreher and Fuchs (2016), make one of the first attempts to 
empirically examine the Chinese development financing activities and the determinants of 
Chinese aid allocation. The authors treat their data as cross-sectional and employ a fractional 
logit model for the empirical investigation. Dreher and Fuchs (2016) find that China acts in 
consistency with its principle of non-inference as the allocation is not influenced by democratic 
status or recipient governance characteristics and the authors find no evidence of a surge for 
natural resources. The findings by Dreher and Fuchs (2016) suggest that there is little difference 
between the determinants of Chinese aid allocation and the determinants of DAC donors’ aid 
allocation.  
Two recent studies by Dreher et al. (2015b) and Li (2015) run cross-country regressions 
on Chinese aid allocation in Africa, both studies use AidData’s database as the source of 
Chinese aid. Li (2015) treats the data as cross-sectional, while Dreher et al. (2015b) run both 
pooled OLS regressions and then make use of the data’s panel structure in a fixed effects 
estimation. Both studies make the important distinction between ODA flows and Other Official 
Flows (OOF) to examine what determines the allocation of the respective resource flows.  Their 
results are in line with Bräutigam (2009), who claims that the early qualitative literature mixed 
different financial development flows like apples with oranges and therefore misinterpreted 
Chinese aid determinants. Dreher et al (2015b) and Li (2015) find that Chinese ODA is mainly 
driven by recipient needs, proxied by GDP per capita, and by foreign policy considerations4. 
OOF allocation is better explained by China’s commercial interests. Inconsistence with the 
Chinese policy of non-inference, the authors find no evidence that ODA flows are determined 
by institutional quality considerations like control of corruption or democracy.  
                                                          
3 Also Strange et al., (2013) provides an excellent overview.  
4 Measured as the recipients stand on the “One-China” policy, UN voting behavior and number of visits by high 
level Chinese politicians. 
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Closely related literature to this current study is Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2011), who 
empirically test whether Chinese financial flows are directed towards countries that receive less 
aid from bilateral DAC donors, and Hernandez (2015), who empirically investigates whether 
World Bank conditionality in Africa is affected by aid inflow from China.  Giovannetti and 
Sanfilippo (2011) use data that originates from publications of the annual China Statistical 
Yearbook. One big drawback of this data, compared to the data available today, is that it 
includes all kinds of Chinese external assistance from ODA to overseas contracts won by 
Chinese firms. Hence, the authors are not clear on what they actually measure, and even if their 
data may be correlated with actual Chinese ODA flows, the figures are most likely biased. The 
authors use a fixed effects estimator and find a negative and statistically significant correlation 
between DAC aid and their employed measure of Chinese aid. The authors’ interpretation of 
this finding is that China substitute for DAC aid withdrawals in recipient countries. However, 
from an aid effectiveness point of view, a negative and statistically significant relationship 
could instead be interpreted as good coordination as geographic clustering is avoided (Klasen 
& Davies, 2011), and the interpretation would instead be a complementing Chinese aid 
allocation to that of the DAC. The validity of the data employed by Giovannetti and Sanfilippo 
(2011) is a concern that needs to be considered in a serious manner and unfortunately the data 
caveat questions the overall validity of their results. When Berthélemy (2011) employs data 
from the same source, a significant correlation between the DAC donors’ and Chinese cross-
country allocation of aid cannot be confirmed. The author’s interpretation is that Chinese aid 
does not increase aid fragmentation in recipient countries.  
Hernandez (2015) uses the same data source of Chinese aid as this current study, and there 
are also similarities in the theoretical frameworks employed. The author’s main hypothesis is 
that increasing aid, exclusively in the form of ODA loans (not grants), from emerging donors 
like China, may explain the changes in rigidity of the World Bank loan conditionality in recent 
years. This is considered to be the case if these new sources of aid are perceived by recipient 
governments as attractive and uncoordinated outside options to DAC aid that impose no 
conditionality. Hernandez (2015) assumes that emerging donors impose no or few conditions, 
and argues that the World Bank will adjust conditionality downwards if aid from emerging 
donors causes an excess supply of aid in aid recipient countries. The main finding of the study, 
and in line with the author’s hypothesis, is that a larger inflow of Chinese aid is associated with 
significantly less World Bank conditions. One plausible explanation discussed in the study is 
that the World Bank adjusts the number of conditions in an attempt to stay competitive and 
maintain its level of aid activities in recipient countries.  
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Hernandez’s result suggests that Chinese aid may be additional to World Bank aid and 
perceived as a competitive aid source by the World Bank, but a more proper analysis examining 
the general relationship between Chinese aid and DAC aid allocation also needs to take the 
bilateral DAC aid and grants into account. This analysis may also be better performed in a 
model running in the reverse direction, where China is responsive to already established DAC 
aid allocation priorities. Therefore, this current study aims to perform such an exercise and 
analysis in a framework where China is the more responsive donor and allocation is determined 
by DAC aid allocation, rather than the other way around. Furthermore, there are no attempts in 
the existing literature to examine the relationship between Chinese and DAC aid allocation 
within countries at the sector level, hence this study seems to be the first.  
4. Theoretical Framework, Mechanisms and Research Questions 
There is no existing theoretical framework that tries to explain the potential relationship 
between the allocation of DAC and Chinese aid flows in terms of donor coordination, and 
whether Chinese aid and DAC aid could be described as competing or complementing each 
other. Therefore, this study reviews the related literature concerning DAC donor coordination 
and aid conditionality as well as Chinese non-inference policy and demand-driven aid, in an 
attempt to build a theoretical basis. The literature is used in order to identify theoretical 
mechanisms that may explain why Chinese aid allocation responds more to DAC aid allocation, 
than the other way around, and hence present empirical indices and suggestions about the likely 
direction of this response in a two-level framework. 
The definitions of competition and complementarity aid efforts in the two-level 
framework, that the following part of the study will refer to, are presented in Table 2. One of 
the five principles to make aid more effective, outlined in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, is donor harmonization. The idea is that when donors coordinate their efforts, 
reduce aid fragmentation and project duplication in recipient countries, a complementary 
allocation of resources on both cross-country and within-country sectoral and geographical 
levels would increase the overall aid effectiveness (OECD, 2005/2008). Following this logic, a 
complementary relationship between Chinese aid and DAC aid allocation would imply a 
negative correlation between the respective donors’ country level allocations (Klasen & Davies, 
2011). However, even if the aid flows on average target the same recipient countries, Chinese 
aid and DAC aid could still be complementary to each other within countries if the aid flows 
target different sectors. As defined in Table 2, this study considers Chinese aid an uncoordinated 
and competing aid flow to DAC aid if the Chinese aid target the same countries and the same 
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sectors within countries as the DAC aid. However, if the aid flows target different sectors within 
countries, the coordination problem is alleviated and the Chinese aid should be considered a 
within-country complement. If Chinese aid and DAC aid on average target different countries 
but the same sectors within countries, this implies a complementary cross-country coordination 
but less coordination within countries as Chinese aid and DAC aid compete to serve the same 
sectors. If Chinese aid on average targets both different countries and different sectors within 
countries this would imply a well-coordinated and effective outcome of aid allocation from the 
perspective presented in the Paris Declaration. Such a result would suggest that the increasing 
Chinese aid engagement in Africa is mainly complementary to the traditional DAC donors’ aid 
engagements both across and within countries.  
Table 2. Definition matrix of donor competition and complementary aid efforts in a two-level analysis 
 
Within-country analysis 
Within a recipient country Chinese and 
DAC aid is allocated to the same 
sectors 
Within a recipient country Chinese and 
DAC aid is allocated to different sectors 
C
r
o
ss
-c
o
u
n
tr
y
 a
n
a
ly
si
s 
Chinese aid and DAC aid do on 
average  target the same recipient 
countries 
Chinese aid is allocated additional to 
DAC aid across and within countries.  
 
Implies low coordination and competition 
between donors. 
At country level, Chinese aid compete 
with DAC aid. 
 
Within countries, Chinese aid is a 
complement to DAC aid. 
Chinese aid and DAC aid do on 
average  target different  recipient 
countries 
At country level, Chinese aid is a 
complement DAC aid. 
 
Within countries, Chinese aid compete 
with DAC aid. 
Chinese aid is allocated as a complement 
to DAC aid both across and within 
countries.  
 
Implies well-coordinated and potentially 
effective allocation of aid.  
Source: Author’s own definitions 
4.1 Theoretical Mechanisms 
The fact that China is not involved in coordination activities, that their aid appear to be more 
demand driven and require little or no conditionality may have implications for how the Chinese 
aid is allocated directly or indirectly in response to DAC aid allocation.  
In alignment with The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 and the subsequent 
Accra Agenda for Action of 2008, the traditional DAC donors have committed to improve the 
coordination of aid activities in an attempt to avoid aid fragmentation, duplication of project 
initiatives and ultimately increase aid effectiveness (OECD, 2005/2008). China, on the other 
hand, is not actively participating in the DAC donor community and has only signed the 
declaration as an aid recipient and not as a donor. Instead, China has established FOCAC as a 
main forum for dialogue with the African countries and China is labeling its engagement in 
Africa a South-South development cooperation model that is built on mutual understanding and 
mutual benefits (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Furthermore, the prevailing literature has 
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suggested that China may not have an interest in integrating into the current donor system 
constructed by the traditional aid donors5 (Lancaster, 2007; Tierney, 2014). Even if China is 
not aiming to overturn the existing OECD DAC community, there are several examples of 
situations where an outside aid option offered by China disrupted ongoing project negotiations 
between DAC donors and recipient governments in Africa (Woods, 2008;Tan-Mullins et al., 
2010). Hence, this block of literature may suggest that China prefers a global presence as a 
donor and that China is mainly competing with DAC over the same countries.  
To what extent China’s aid allocation is essentially motivated and initiated from within 
China is still an open question. Chinese aid is suggested to be more demand driven than aid 
from traditional DAC donors, which implies that aid projects are initiated and requested from 
the government in a recipient country. Demand driven aid implies that a certain aid project 
starts with a request from the recipient country government to the Chinese embassy office in 
the host country. Thereafter, the Chinese aid programs and projects are typically negotiated in 
high-level political meetings with little or no transparency (Tan-Mullins et al., 2010; Dreher et 
al., 2015a). If demand for Chinese aid is the main driving mechanism in Chinese aid allocation, 
this would imply that the Chinese aid is indirectly responsive to DAC aid through recipient 
demand. This mechanism suggests that the demand for Chinese aid increases in countries and 
in sectors within countries where DAC aid is not sufficient or not available, and that China will 
indirectly allocate its aid accordingly. This may suggest that Chinese aid is allocated as a cross-
country and a within-country sector level complement to DAC aid. This would be a result of 
the demand driven nature and non-conditionality of Chinese aid, which gives the domestic 
leaders in the recipient countries the opportunity to allocate funds in accordance with the most 
urgent needs in sectors that have been unable to attract large DAC aid and private flows, for 
example infrastructure and productive sectors (Bräutigam, 2011; Strange et al., 2013). 
However, a downside of the demand driven nature and fungibility of Chinese aid that needs to 
be mentioned is that it may also enable recipient governments to allocate the aid according to 
their own self-interest rather than development concerns. For example, Dreher et al. (2015a) 
find that Chinese aid is disproportionally allocated to the recipient leader’s birth region and 
Bräutigam (2011) argue that Chinese aid is more prone to be captured for prestige-projects, like 
presidential palaces and stadiums.  
China’s no strings-attached policy has been heavily debated and criticized. Some scholars 
argue that China’s unconditional aid undermines DAC aid conditionality aimed to encourage 
                                                          
5 China may on the other hand have an interest in coordinating future activities with the other BRICS countries, 
Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa. 
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democracy and human rights (Woods, 2008; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010). There is a consensus in 
the existing literature that, at least some traditional donors, allocate according to democratic 
principles (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002; Gates & Hoeffler, 2004; Brück & 
Xu, 2012), while Chinese aid allocation is not influenced by democracy in recipient countries 
(Dreher et al., 2015b; Li, 2015; Dreher & Fuchs, 2016). Furthermore, it is rather intuitive that 
China has no incentives to condition its aid on western democratic values. Hence, this block of 
literature may suggest that Chinese aid could be more competitive in the category of less 
democratic recipient countries where the governments find the Chinese aid particularly 
attractive. 
The findings in the reviewed literature on cross-country determinants of Chinese aid, 
presented in section 3, suggest that Chinese allocation principles are similar to those of the 
traditional donors (Dreher et al., 2015b; Li, 2015; Dreher & Fuchs, 2016). Additionally, 
Hernandez (2015) finds that the World Bank adjusts the number of conditions if Chinese aid is 
available in the same country. At the country level, this literature suggest that there are small 
differences between the motivations behind China’s and DAC’s aid allocation.  Political interest 
and recipient “need” proxied by GDP per capita are the two forceful determinants, and this 
suggests that Chinese aid and DAC aid is likely to be additional to each other and compete for 
aid allocation to the same countries.   
4.2 Research Questions 
The theoretical framework presented in this section is built on the identification of theoretical 
mechanisms in the empirical literature that can be employed to make predictions about the 
relationship between DAC aid and Chinese aid allocation. Even though this theoretical 
framework and the discussions on potential mechanisms are far from conclusive, this study 
aims to utilize this framework in the following empirical investigation due to the lack of other 
available theoretical frameworks in the existing literature. Based on the discussions in the 
previous section, there is no absolute prediction about the relationship between DAC aid and 
Chinese aid allocation. The different blocks of the literature point to different plausible 
mechanisms involved and different corresponding outcomes. Some literature suggests that 
China is not interested in active collaboration and coordination with the DAC community and 
hence allocates its aid additional to DAC aid, which in this framework implies that China and 
DAC are competing to serve the same recipients with aid. A significant and positive correlation 
between DAC aid and Chinese aid would be in favor of such a relationship. The demand driven 
aid literature may instead suggest a complementary relationship, which would be identified 
through a significant and negative correlation between DAC aid and Chinese aid allocation. 
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Considering the conflicting predictions in the theoretical framework, the following two research 
questions are used as guidance in the following empirical investigation: 
Research Question 1: Is Chinese aid allocated in competition with or as a complement to 
cross-country DAC aid allocation? 
If Chinese aid is found to be additional and competing with DAC aid allocation, this would 
be in line with the suggestions that China is not interested in coordination with the DAC 
countries. It would also be in line with the findings in the recent literature on Chinese aid 
allocation, suggesting that there is little difference between the motivations behind Chinese and 
DAC aid allocation. If Chinese aid is found to complement DAC aid, this would be in line with 
the argument that the demand driven nature of Chinese aid may induce Chinese aid to target 
countries where DAC donors are not swarming.  
Research Question 2: Is Chinese aid allocated in competition with or as a complement to 
DAC aid sector allocation within recipient countries? 
If Chinese aid is found to be a complement to DAC aid, i.e. Chinese aid and DAC aid 
target different sector priorities, this would be in favor of the idea that China serves sectors 
where DAC aid is not as influential. This would also be in line with the theoretical argument 
that Chinese demand driven aid is allocated to sectors where traditional aid is more scarce or, 
if Chinese aid is more exposed to political capture, it may be targeted to prestige projects as 
well as to sectors or projects that do not qualify for DAC aid. If the Chinese aid is found to be 
allocated to the same sectors as DAC aid within countries, this would suggest a low 
coordination within countries as China and the bilateral DAC countries are competing to serve 
the same sectors with aid.  
5. Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
5.1 Data Sources 
This study relies on two key data sources. First, the most recently published version of the 
unique data set on Chinese aid introduced by Strange et al. (2015a), AidData's Chinese Official 
Finance to Africa Dataset, 2000-2013, version 1.2. Second, the officially published data on 
bilateral and multilateral DAC aid flows from OECD DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS). 
As China does not publish information about their annual foreign aid activities officially or 
report their aid  activities to OECD DAC, the data set collected by Strange and co-authors is 
the only available source of disaggregated data on Chinese foreign aid. The methodology used 
for gathering the data is an open-source data collection methodology called Tracking 
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Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF). In the data collection process a wide range of 
worldwide data sources are screened and additional to traditional media sources as newspapers, 
radio and television transcripts, also academic articles, non-governmental organization (NGO) 
reports and government websites etc. are utilized in the collection process (Strange et al, 2015a; 
Strange et al, 2015b). One strength of the Chinese Official Finance to Africa data is that it is 
compiled in a way that makes the structure similar and comparable to OECD DACs CRS data. 
The 1.2 version of AidData's Chinese Official Finance to Africa data provides disaggregated 
project-level information about 2 647 Chinese development finance activities in 51 African 
countries, all of them committed to the recipient countries between the year 2000 and 2013.  
Strange et al. (2015a) have raised and discussed a number of concerns about the data 
completeness and potential pitfalls. First, there is risk of human errors in the data coding 
process. The risk of data errors do, however, apply to most available datasets and in an attempt 
to mitigate this risk, each project in the database has been reviewed by multiple researchers. A 
second concern is incompleteness of information and conflicting information about a certain 
project in different public media sources. In order to overcome this problem, researchers have 
used complementing sources such as government documents, NGO reports and journal article 
to be able to decide on conflicting media information. As the data sources rely mainly on public 
media, a third concern about the data is the risk of “detection bias”. It seems reasonable to 
assume that there is a general media bias towards larger projects as well as projects attracting 
public interest. Smaller aid projects and projects located in rural areas far away from the capital 
or other large cities may on the other hand be less likely to receive public media attention. A 
related problem is also the issue that media coverage of aid projects in countries with low levels 
of press freedom is likely to be deficient (Strange et al., 2015a).  
All in all, it seems reasonable to assume that the number of projects and financial amounts 
reported in the Chinese aid database are the lower boundary of total Chinese aid to Africa. 
AidData's Chinese Official Finance to Africa dataset is of course an incomplete substitute for 
official data, but it is still the most comprehensive and reliable data on Chinese aid available 
today. Therefore, this study makes the assumption that the largest and most significant Chinese 
aid projects are very likely to be covered in the data.  
5.2 Sample Selection 
In the following empirical analyses, this study will use the most conservative definition of aid, 
ODA. For an aid project to qualify as ODA, the aid flow must be provided by official agencies 
to developing countries on the DAC list of ODA recipients. Furthermore, the main target of the 
flow must be economic development and welfare and the flow needs to be concessional in its 
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nature and have a grant element of at least 25 percent (OECD, 2008). Due to some uncertainty 
about the development intent and degree of concessionality of the Chinese aid projects, this 
study needs to rely on the coders’ second-best definition, labelled ODA-like projects in the 
Chinese aid data. Projects coded as anything else but ODA-like in the Chinese aid data or ODA 
in the CRS data are excluded from the following analyses. To make the data in the two databases 
more comparable to each other, projects coded as administrative costs and costs covering 
refugees in donor countries in the DAC CRS data are excluded. The argument is that the two 
aid budget posts inflate the DAC aid compared to the Chinese aid as these two aid costs are 
hard to track through media reports and hence comparable budget posts are not reported in 
Chinese aid data. Furthermore, the final sample is restricted to bilateral flows with only one 
recipient country. This implies that any project in the data sources without a breakdown to 
specified country level is excluded.  
Following Dreher et al. (2015b), this study excludes data from 2013 with the argument that 
the Chinese aid data for 2013 may be restricted in comparison to previous years due to limited 
accumulated media information. When searching in the database, missing values of the actual 
aid amounts committed to aid projects in year 2013 is confirmed as a big concern. Aid flows to 
South Sudan and Somalia are also excluded from the final sample. South Sudan is excluded as 
it became an independent state in 2011 and Somalia is excluded due to data limitations in the 
explanatory variables employed for this study. Libya was not a country on the DAC recipient 
list between the years 2000 and 2004 and will therefore be excluded from the analysis before 
year 20066. 
The final sample used in the cross-country empirical analysis includes 52 African recipient 
countries and cover the years from 2000 to 2012. It is an unbalanced panel7 with a total of 670 
individual country-year observations.  
For the within-country sector analysis, the country level aid flows are aggregated into nine 
broad sectors, following the sector categorization used by Bigsten et al. (2016). However, three 
of these sectors are excluded from the within-country analysis, these are Actions related to debt, 
Humanitarian aid and the sector category Other. Actions relating to debt is excluded because 
the aid reported in this channel, like debt forgiveness, is only received in the recipient countries 
in an abstract rather than practical sense. Humanitarian aid is excluded because it is inherently 
unpredictable and Other is excluded because it is inflated by aid spent in donor countries. In 
                                                          
6 DAC aid enter the econometric regression with a one year lag and Libya will therefore not be included in the 
sample until 2006, i.e. 2005 + 1 year.  
7 Unbalanced only due to the exclusion of Libya before year 2006.  
 15 
 
the panel used for the within-country sector analysis, the unit of observation is a specific 
country-sector-year, i.e. a specific sector within a recipient country in a given year. It covers 6 
sectors within 48 countries during 2000-2012 and it is an unbalanced panel with 3708 individual 
sector-country-year observations. Compared to the country sample included in the cross-
country analysis, Gambia, Swaziland, Sao Tome & Principe and Burkina Faso are excluded 
because none of these countries received Chinese aid during the time period under 
consideration. This means that the countries, if included, would be useless for within-country 
predictions. Appendix A1 and A2 provide exhaustive lists of the countries and sectors covered 
in this study. 
5.3 Dependent Variable 
This study employs different dependent variables in the spatial cross-country analysis and in 
the within-country sector analysis. The cross-country regressions use three different measures 
of the dependent variable, 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑑. The main measure is a binary indicator variable that is 
equal to 1 if a country c receives Chinese aid in year t. This is a rough measure of aid and comes 
with the caveat of providing limited variation and information about the Chinese aid. Due to 
the limitations of the binary indicator variable, this study follows the existing literature on the 
determinants of Chinese aid allocation and complement the cross-country analysis with two 
continuous measures of Chinese aid. 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑑 will be measured as the log amount of 
Chinese aid per capita8 committed to a country c in year t and as the total number of Chinese 
aid projects committed to a country c in year t. There are pros and cons with both these 
measures. The actual aid amounts that China has committed themselves to deliver would 
probably be the most intuitive way of measuring Chinese aid, but unfortunately a large fraction, 
approximately 42 percent, of the individual project data on committed amounts is missing in 
the Chinese data sample9. Even if the bias introduced by the missing amounts might be 
negligible, conditional on an assumption that most of this missing values correspond to small 
projects that did not attract public attention, this measure of Chinese aid might still be 
misleading. Therefore, the number of Chinese aid projects will be employed as a third measure 
of Chinese aid even if it holds no information about the size of aid projects. This study argues 
that the two latter measures are imperfect, but still informative as complements to the main 
measure of the dependent variable, i.e. the binary indicator variable of Chinese aid.  
                                                          
8 This study uses logged amounts in an attempt to reduce problems with heteroscedasticity and outliers as well as 
to make interpretation of the results more convenient and the large deviations in aid volumes easy to compare.  
9 Committed amounts are missing for 659 of the 1567 Chinese aid projects covered in the sample selection. The 
share of missing amounts per year ranges between approximately 20 percent in 2001 and 52 percent in 2008.  
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In the within-country sector analysis, the dependent variable, 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑑, is 
defined as a binary indicator variable that is equal to 1 if sector i in a country c receives Chinese 
aid in year t. No additional measure of the dependent variable will be employed as the mean 
and median number of aid projects received by a country in a specific year is only equal to 2, 
while the within-country sector analysis considers 6 different sectors, and hence the dependent 
variable will therefore contain a lot of country-sector-year observations that do not receive any 
Chinese aid. See the summary statistics for the dependent variables in Table 4, section 5.6. 
5.4 Key Explanatory Variables 
The key explanatory variable in the cross-country analysis, 𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑎𝑖𝑑, is defined as the logged 
amount of total bilateral DAC aid per capita committed to country c in year t-1. This variable 
is used to examine the relationship between cross-country DAC aid and Chinese aid allocation. 
The sign, magnitude and significance level of this variable is assumed to capture the extent to 
which China takes notice of the aid allocation of DAC donors and how China responds to that 
given allocation. The main argument for excluding all multilateral donors’ aid from the 
analysis, is that it would be difficult to make an informative decision about which multilateral 
donors that should be included and not. China has at least to some extend been cooperating with 
some multilateral agencies since 2005 and without any further knowledge about these 
cooperations the decision about which multilateral donors that should be included or not would 
be arbitrary. A list of the 29 bilateral DAC donors is provided in appendix A3. 
 The key explanatory variable in the within-country sector analysis, 𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑑, is 
measured as the logged amount of  total bilateral DAC aid committed to the specific sector i in 
country c in year t-1.  
A notable difference between the key explanatory variable in the spatial cross-country 
analysis and the within-country sector analysis is that 𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑎𝑖𝑑 is measured in per capita terms 
while 𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑑 is not. In the cross-country analysis, DAC aid per capita is employed as 
this study considers it a better measure for how “crowded” an aid recipient country is. However, 
in the within-country sector analysis, this study argues that it makes little sense to employ DAC 
aid per capita rather than the total amount of DAC aid committed to a certain sector.  
5.5 Additional Control Variables 
The reviewed literature on Chinese cross-country aid determinants provides an extensive list of 
suitable control variables that will be used also in this study. The control variables can be 
categorized into four broad clusters; variables controlling for recipient “need”, variables 
controlling for commercial interest and the recipient countries’ natural resource endowments, a 
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set of controls for China’s political ties with recipient countries and controls for the quality of 
institutions.  
AidData uses a wide range of sources in different languages, but still most of the sources 
are in English and Chinese. Therefore, a binary variable that indicates if English is official 
language in the recipient country is added to control for the likely underestimation of aid in 
countries where English is not an official language, as proposed by Dreher et al.(2015b). Year 
dummies are included to control for year fixed effects and following the United Nations 
geographical geoscheme, the African continent is divided into five subregions10 to be able to 
include region dummies and hence control for region fixed effects (United Nations Statistical 
Division, 2014). 
To proxy for recipient countries’ level of need, logged GDP per capita, logged population 
size and logged number of people affected by natural disasters are employed. The logged value 
of China’s total trade with a recipient country is employed as a proxy for China’s commercial 
interest, and the logged value of mineral depletion together with a control for the logged value 
of energy depletion are employed as controls for natural resource endowments in recipient 
countries.  
The recipient countries’ stance towards the One-China policy and their voting behavior in 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)11 are employed as proxies for recipient 
countries’ political ties with China. The control employed for stance towards the One-China 
policy is Timothy Rich’s binary indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a recipient country 
recognize the government in Taiwan, Taipei, rather than the government in Beijing12. The 
indicator of UNGA voting behavior is measured as the voting alignment on all votes in the 
United Nations General Assembly and it ranges between 0 and 1.   
The Political Rights index from Freedom House and the Control of Corruption index from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators project are used as proxies for recipient countries’ 
institutional quality. There are numerous indexes available that can be used to proxy for 
institutional quality. The Political Rights index is chosen for this study because of the extensive 
data coverage, even though it has not been widely used in the aid literature. The Political Rights 
index is a point scale ranging from 1 to 7 where the value of 1 representing most free countries 
and 7 representing least free countries in the original index. However, in order to make the 
interpretations in the following econometric analysis more intuitive the index is transformed 
                                                          
10 Northern Africa, Western Africa, Central Africa, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa.  
11 The author is extremely grateful to Axel Dreher and Andreas Fuchs for sharing this unpublished data.  
12 The author updated this indicator for year 2008 to 2012 using news articles and government website as sources.  
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into the reverse direction in this current study. This implies that a point of 1 representing the 
least free countries and a point of 7 representing the most free countries in the data sample. The 
Control of Corruption index13 ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, higher values correspond to better 
governance. Table 3 presents the predictive capacity of the explanatory variables (or similar 
variants of the explanatory variables from the earliest literature) that has been found in the 
existing literature. The dependent variables, key explanatory variables and all additional control 
variables are presented with variable definitions and the variable sources in appendix A4.  
Table 3. Predictive capacity of the control variables 
Name of control variable Predictive capacity Source 
GDP per capita (log)  + and statistically significant Dreher et al., 2015b; Li 2015; Dreher and Fuchs 2016 
 ambiguous  Giovannetti and Sanfilippo 2011; Berthélemy 2011 
Population size (log)   - and statistically significant Dreher et al. 2015b; Li 2015; Dreher and Fuchs 2016  
 - and statistically significant Berthélemy 2011 
People affected by disasters (log) ambiguous    Dreher et al., 2015b; Dreher and Fuchs 2016 
Total trade with China (log)  not informative Dreher et al., 2015b 
 + and statistically significant Giovannetti and Sanfilippo 2011 
Mineral depletion (log)  not informative  Dreher et al., 2015b; Dreher and Fuchs 2016 
Energy depletion (log) not informative Dreher et al., 2015b; Dreher and Fuchs 2016 
Taiwan recognition  - and statistically significant Dreher et al., 2015b; Dreher and Fuchs 2016 
UNGA voting with China + and statistically significant Dreher et al., 2015b; Dreher and Fuchs 2016 
Control of Corruption not informative Dreher et al., 2015b; Li 2015 
Political Rights not used in reviewed literature  
English language + and statistically significant Dreher et al., 2015b 
   
5.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the three measures of 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑑, the key explanatory 
variable and all additional controls employed in the cross-country regressions. The Chinese aid 
dummy has a mean of 0.716, hence the distribution is skewed towards 1 and approximately 
72% of the independent country-year observations in the sample receive Chinese aid. The 
continuous measure of the dependent variable, amounts of Chinese aid committed per capita, 
is presented both before and after taking the log in order to get a better intuition of the amounts. 
The mean of Chinese aid that a country in the sample receives in a year is approximately 5.57 
US dollars per capita, the maximum amount of Chinese aid that a country has received over the 
years is 699.2 US dollars per capita and the minimum amount is zero. Concerning the third 
measure of 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑑, number of Chinese aid projects, both the mean and median number 
                                                          
13 To solve the problem with missing values for year 1999 and 2001 when data for Control of Corruption was not 
collected, the variable is interpolated. Appendix A5 provides summary statistics before and after the interpolation. 
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of projects received in a country over the years is 2 Chinese aid projects. The number of projects 
ranges from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 18 projects.  
 Also the key explanatory variable, 𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑎𝑖𝑑, is presented in Table 4 both before and after 
taking the log of DAC aid per capita. As can be seen in the table, all African countries receive 
DAC aid in all years represented in the sample. The mean amount of DAC aid that a country 
receives in a year is equal to 52.51 US dollars per capita and the median is equal to 35.38 US 
dollars per capita. The maximum amount of DAC aid that a country has received over the years 
is approximately 624 US dollars per capita which is less than the maximum Chinese amount of 
US dollar per capita. Amounts of US dollars are not deflated to a common base year, and the 
main argument for that is the short panel employed with low inflation rate over the time period 
covered. Furthermore, year dummies and the use of log amounts should be able to partly 
mitigate the potential problem with inflated values.  
Concerning the descriptive statistics for the control variables it is worth noting that only 
12 percent of the country-year observations recognize Taiwan and that some of the additional 
controls suffer from missing values, which will unfortunately reduce the number of 
observations that can be utilized in the empirical investigation.  
Table 4. Summary Statistics, variables in cross-country analysis14 
Dependent variable Obs Mean Median Std.dev Min Max 
China aid dummy 670 0.716 1 0.451 0 1 
Chinese aid per capita (log) 670 -7.235 -3.347 8.249 -16.12 6.550 
Chinese aid per capita (current USD) 670 5.573 0.0352 33.23 0 699.2 
Number of Chinese projects 670 2.339 2 2.476 0 18 
Key explanatory variable (t-1) Obs Mean Median Std.dev Min Max 
DAC aid per capita (log) 670 3.532 3.566 0.914 0.010 6.437 
DAC aid per capita (current USD) 670 52.51 35.38 64.18 1.010 624.4 
Additional controls (t-1)15 Obs Mean Median Std.dev Min Max 
English language 670 0.427 0 0.495 0 1 
People affected by disasters (log) 670 6.875 8.185 5.219 0 16.52 
UNGA voting with China 670 0.834 0.877 0.116 0.500 0.957 
Taiwan recognition  670 0.119 0 0.325 0 1 
Control of Corruption 670 -0.574 -0.649 0.564 -1.733 1.250 
Mineral depletion (log) (current USD) 670 10.51 13.86 8.089 0 23.11 
Energy depletion (log) (current USD) 661 8.807 0 9.893 0 24.68 
GDP per capita (log) (current USD) 669 6.701 6.421 1.149 4.612 10.02 
Population size (log)   670 15.74 16.10 1.599 11.29 18.91 
Total trade with China (log) (current USD) 665 18.80 19.02 2.337 11.00 24.54 
Political Rights 670 3.530 3 1.819 1 7 
 
                                                          
14 The value of 10-7 was added to the dependent variable, 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑑, before taking the logarithm when measured 
as the amount of Chinese aid per capita. The value 1 was added to the key explanatory controls, 𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑎𝑖𝑑 and 
𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑑, as well as to the additional controls for Mineral depletion, Energy depletion and People affected 
by natural disasters before taking the logarithms.  
15 Except for People affected by disasters 
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Table 5 presents summary statistics for the dependent variable, 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒  𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑑, 
defined as a binary indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a sector within a country receives 
Chinese aid in a particular year t. Presented is also the key explanatory variable, 
𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑑, defined as the log amount of DAC aid committed to a certain sector within a 
country in year t-1. The Chinese aid dummy has a mean of 0.189, which implies a skewed 
distribution towards zero; approximately 19% of the independent sector-country-year 
observations in the sample receives Chinese aid over the time period. The minimum amount of 
DAC aid committed to a sector within a country during a specific year is zero, while the 
maximum amount is close to astonishing 1.3 billion US dollars. The mean amount of DAC aid 
is approximately 62 million, while the median is only 15 million US dollars. 
Table 5. Summary Statistics, variables in within-country sector analysis 
Variables Obs Mean Median Std.dev Min Max 
China aid dummy 3,708 0.189 0 0.392 0 1 
Total DAC aid (log) t-1 3,708 14.80 16.55 5.471 0 20.98 
Total DAC aid t-1 (current USD) 3,708 62.29 million 15.45 million 134.6 million 0 1 294 million 
 
Figure 1 displays the time trend for Chinese aid to Africa, measured as both the number of 
aid projects and the amount in millions of current US dollars. Both measures of Chinese aid 
indicate an overall increase in Chinese aid to Africa over the time period. The figure reveals a 
large increase in Chinese aid projects and amounts in 2006 as compared to previous years. A 
speculative explanation for this peak might be that China, during the 2006 FOCAC meeting in 
Beijing, made promises to increase its financial assistance to Africa. Another peak in Chinese 
aid amounts is revealed for 2012, this time without a corresponding increase in Chinese aid 
projects. This time a speculative explanation could be a larger number of Chinese megadeals in 
2012 than in previous years, four large aid recipient countries16 did for example receive more 
aid from China in 2012 than from total bilateral DAC donor countries. However, this is only 
guesswork due to the lack of proof for any other explanation.  
Figure 2 shows the time trend of the Chinese aid amounts as a share of the total bilateral 
DAC aid over the years. During most years Chinese aid amounts has fluctuated around 5 percent 
of the total DAC aid and the trend follows closely the trend in Chinese aid amounts displayed 
in Figure 1. The Chinese aid as a percent of the total bilateral DAC aid peaks in 2012 when 
Chinese aid was equivalent to approximately 23 percent of bilateral DAC aid in Africa. 
 
 
                                                          
16 Tanzania, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Republic of the Congo. 
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Figure 1. Chinese aid to Africa, 2000-2012                  Figure 2. Chinese aid to Africa in percent of total DAC aid 
          
Appendix A6 presents the evolution of log amounts of Chinese aid and DAC aid per capita 
by recipient country and year. Compared to the DAC aid, the Chinese aid is highly volatile from 
year to year. There are also four countries in the sample that do not receive any aid from China 
over the time period, it is Sao Tome and Principe, Gambia, Swaziland and Burkina Faso. 
Interestingly, these countries have in common that they all recognized the government in Taipei 
and not the government in Beijing during the full time period, 2000-2012.  
6. Econometric Specifications and Empirical Strategy   
6.1 Baseline Econometric Specifications and Empirical Strategy 
The following econometric specifications are employed for the investigation of research 
question 1 and 2:  
Spatial Cross-Country Analysis  
Pr (𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑟𝑡 = 1) = Φ(𝛽𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑿
′
𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜏𝑟 + 𝜖𝑐𝑟𝑡 )   (1) 
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑿′𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜏𝑟 + 𝜖𝑐𝑟𝑡        (2) 
Within-Country Sector Analysis 
Pr (𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 1) = Φ(𝜕𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑖𝑐 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑡 )  (3) 
The baseline specifications in equation (1) and (2) are used for the spatial cross-country 
analysis. In equation (1) a pooled probit model is used as the dependent variable is a binary 
indicator variable that is equal to 1 if Chinese aid is committed to country c in subregion r in 
year t. 𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 is the key explanatory variable, it is the total amount of DAC aid per 
capita committed to country c in subregion r in year t-1. 𝛼𝑡 is a vector of year dummies 
controlling for year fixed effects and  𝜏𝑟 is a vector of the five subregion dummy variables.  X 
is a vector including the additional control variables presented in section 5.4, except for the 
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variable People effected by disasters, all controls enter the equations with a one year time lag. 
The pooled probit model predicts whether the likelihood for a country to receive Chinese aid in 
year t is determined by the amount of DAC aid per capita that the same country received in the 
previous year.   
Equation (2) is a pooled ordinary least square (OLS) model, in which the two continuous 
measures of the dependent variable are employed. The dependent variable is measured as the 
log amount of Chinese aid per capita committed to country c in subregion r in year t and as the 
total number of Chinese aid projects committed to country c in subregion r in year t. The pooled 
OLS models examine if the amounts of Chinese aid per capita and number of Chinese aid 
projects committed to a country in year t is determined by the amount of DAC aid per capita 
that the same country received in the previous year. The key explanatory variable and the 
additional control variables in equation (1) and (2) are identical. A negative and significant 
estimate of 𝛽 is in favor of a complementary relationship between DAC aid and Chinese aid at 
the country level. While a positive and significant estimate of 𝛽 suggests that Chinese aid is 
mainly additional and allocated in competition with DAC aid. 
 The specification in equation (3) is used for the within-country sector analysis. Again, a 
pooled probit model is employed as the dependent variable is a binary indicator variable that is 
equal to 1 if Chinese aid is committed to sector i in country c in year t. 𝐷𝐴𝐶 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 is 
the key explanatory variable, it is the log total amount of bilateral DAC aid committed to sector 
i in country c in year t-1. Following Öhler (2013), 𝜑𝑖𝑐 is added to control for country-sector 
fixed effects that accounts for sector-specific needs that vary across countries and 𝛼𝑡 is a vector 
of year dummies controlling for year fixed effects. The pooled probit model predicts whether 
the likelihood of receiving Chinese aid allocated to a certain sector i within country c in year t, 
is determined by the committed amount of DAC aid to the same country and sector in the 
previous year. A negative and significant estimate of 𝜕 is in favor of a complementary sector 
level relationship between DAC aid and Chinese aid allocation within countries. A positive and 
statistically significant estimate of 𝜕 implies that Chinese aid is allocated additionally and in 
competition with DAC aid sector priorities. 
In the following regression analyses, and if nothing else is specified, robust standard errors 
are clustered at the level of individual recipient countries in equation (1) and (2), and clustered 
by country-sector pairs in equation (3) to allow for within cluster correlation.  
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6.2 Endogeneity Concerns and Robustness Checks 
A discussion about the key assumption in this study and endogeneity problems are important. 
According to the theoretical framework, China seems more likely to respond to the traditional 
DAC donors’ aid allocation than the other way around. Hence, the key assumption is that China 
is the more responsive donor. The proposed mechanisms are that Chinese aid might be guided 
by direct motivation of not coordinating aid with other DAC donors and instead behave in a 
competitive manner. Another idea is that the DAC aid allocation is constrained by a consensus 
of certain conditionality and coordination efforts in their allocation which does not apply to 
Chinese aid and hence makes Chinese aid management more flexible. Chinese aid is also 
purported to be demand driven and hence predicted to be demanded by countries and targeting 
sectors where governments perceive that DAC aid is not sufficient. Furthermore, this study 
suggests that China is likely to be in a better position to react to DAC aid allocation than vice 
versa due to the lack of transparency in the Chinese aid management process.  
This empirical approach do however suffer from endogeneity, and the potential 
simultaneity issue is the most aggravating factor in the following empirical analysis. There are 
obvious reasons to believe that reverse causality may be a source of endogeneity. The DAC 
donors may be better informed about Chinese aid commitments and more flexible and 
responsive in their allocation decisions than what is assumed in this study. Hence, it is possible 
that China and the DAC donors are simultaneously reacting on each other’s aid allocation which 
makes identification of a causal relationship impossible. An instrumental variable (IV) strategy 
could have been employed to establish causality, but in the absence of a valid IV for DAC aid, 
this study makes a modest attempt to mitigate the endogeneity concerns by the introduction of 
a time lag, as proposed by Hernandez (2015). It also important to note that even without a strong 
case of causality, the identification of a simple correlation between Chinese aid and DAC aid 
allocation is still interesting for the discussion on donor coordination and aid effectiveness, 
hence the importance of causality may be of second order.  
Following Dreher et al. (2015b), this study does not attempt to employ the fixed effects 
approach or add country dummies to control for country fixed effects in the spatial cross-
country baseline specifications, equation (1) and equation (2), as it would only allow this study 
to exploit country-specific variation over time. That approach would imply a loss of important 
between-recipient country variation and hence make it more difficult to identify the relationship 
between Chinese aid and DAC aid allocation. Therefore, this study aggregates the fixed effects 
one level and employs subregion fixed effects rather than country fixed effects in the baseline 
specifications. A caveat of this approach is unfortunately that a statistically significant effect of 
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DAC aid allocation on Chinese aid allocation may be spurious and come from country specific 
unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with both Chinese aid and DAC aid. Therefore, this 
study utilizes the data’s panel structure and introduces country fixed effects in a fixed effects 
estimation as a robustness check. As already presented in the previous section, a pooled probit 
model is employed for the baseline regression, equation (1), with the binary indicator of Chinese 
aid as dependent variable. As a robustness check, equation (1) is also estimated with a pooled 
linear probability model (LPM) using the OLS estimator and a LPM country fixed effects 
estimation. Next, the dependent variable is altered to the two continuous measures of Chinese 
aid in equation (2).  For the baseline regressions pooled OLS estimations are employed and the 
fixed effects estimator is employed as robustness checks.  
The descriptive statistics in appendix A6 reveal that four countries, all of which recognize 
Taiwan, received no Chinese aid during the 2000-2012 period. It seems unlikely that this is a 
random coincidence and could therefore introduce bias in the regression results. To make sure 
that this is not the case, an additional robustness check is performed where equation (1) and (2) 
are re-estimated with a restricted country sample excluding these four countries. One additional 
concern related to the econometric specification is the uncertainty about how fast China can 
respond to changes in DAC aid allocation and whether a one year lag is the most appropriate 
choice. To test the robustness of this choice of a one year time lag, equation (1) and (2) are re-
estimated both with a two year time lag and without lagging DAC aid at all, in order to test for 
an instant reaction. 
Finally, it is important to mention that both equation (1) and (2) may suffer from 
multicollinearity, it is for example likely that the key explanatory variable, DAC aid, is highly 
correlated with some of the other control variables. Appendix A7 presents a table of the pairwise 
correlations of all variables, the correlation matrix gives no reason to expect that high 
correlation between DAC aid and any of the other control variables should be a major concern17.  
The within-country baseline regression specified in equation (3) is a pooled probit model 
where the introduction of country-sector and year fixed effects is used to isolate the sector 
allocation within countries. Thereafter, equation (3) is estimated with a logit model and with a 
fixed effects logit model to check the robustness of the result. The fixed effects logit model has 
an important advantage over the simple probit and logit models, as it can be employed to control 
                                                          
17 The baseline equations were estimated also without the control for DAC aid. This exercise suggested that a 
potential correlation problem may be of small scale as the introduction of DAC aid in the regressions did not, to a 
large extent, affect the significance, sign or magnitude of the other explanatory variables. The results are available 
upon request.  
 25 
 
for the time invariant unobserved country-sector fixed effects. On the other hand, a big 
drawback of the fixed effects logit model is that marginal effects cannot be computed as the 
elimination procedure of the unobserved heterogeneity provides no estimates of the unobserved 
heterogeneity for the individual country-sector pairs. In an additional robustness check, the 
sample is restricted to the three largest key sectors, including Social infrastructure & Services, 
Economic infrastructure & Services and Productive Sectors. As for heterogeneity tests, separate 
regressions will be performed with the three key sectors as subsamples.  
6.3 Cross-Country Heterogeneity Analysis 
This study performs numerous heterogeneity tests to investigate if the effect of DAC aid 
allocation on Chinese aid allocation is heterogeneous for different subsamples. The full country 
sample is divided into two subsamples after income status, democracy status, prevalence of 
corruption, oil endowments and after time period, 2000-2005 and 2006-2012. Table 6 presents 
the descriptive statistics for the variables that define the different subsample. All the country 
and year observations with the lowest 25% point score of the Control of corruption index are 
defined here as having high corruption prevalence. The sample threshold is equivalent to 
approximately -0.985 on a scale ranging from -2.5 to 2.5. The Low income dummy is equal to 
1 if the population in a country during a specific year, lives on less than 1.25 US dollars a day.  
The Oil dummy is equal to 1 if a country has proven oil reserves in a particular year according 
to BP (2015) and lastly the Democracy dummy equals 1 if the country is identified as an 
electoral democracy in a certain year by Freedom House (2015).   
Table 6. Summary statistics, variables defining subsamples in the heterogeneity analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std.dev Min Max 
Democracy dummy 670 0.404 0 0.491 0 1 
Oil dummy 670 0.203 0 0.403 0 1 
Low income dummy 669 0.387 0 0.487 0 1 
High corruption dummy 670 0.251 0 0.434 0 1 
7. Results and Findings 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether Chinese aid allocation takes into account the 
presence of bilateral DAC aid in the cross country and within country aid allocation, as well 
investigate if the two aid sources are better described as competing with each other over the 
same recipient countries and sectors or if the aid flows are mainly complementing each other. 
The two research questions intended to be answered through the analysis of the regression 
results, robustness checks and heterogeneity tests presented in this section is whether the 
Chinese aid is allocated in competition with or as a complement to cross-country DAC aid 
allocation as well as to DAC aid sector allocation within countries. 
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7.1 Cross-Country Regression Results 
Starting with the first research question at the country level, Table 7 column 1 presents the 
regression results when the binary indicator variable of Chinese aid is employed in equation 
(1). The log amount of lagged DAC aid per capita that a country receives is highly statistically 
significant at a 1% significance level with a positive magnitude of 0.0767. Given the inclusion 
of all conventional controls from the Chinese aid allocation literature, this result implies that 
there is a positive relationship between DAC aid allocation and Chinese aid allocation. A one 
standard deviation (0.914) increase in log of DAC aid per capita, is associated with an average 
increase in a country’s probability of receiving Chinese aid with approximately 7.0 percentage 
points the following year.  
 
Table 7. Binary indicator of Chinese aid- Average Marginal effects and Coefficients 
Variable  Marginal effects Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Binary indicator Chinese aid Pooled Probit Pooled LPM LPM FE (within) 
    
DAC aid per capita (log) t-1 0.0767*** 0.0833*** 0.0437* 
 (0.0192) (0.0214) (0.0236) 
UNGA Voting t-1 -0.00603 0.0711 0.0538 
 (0.126) (0.142) (0.156) 
Taiwan recognition t-1 -0.592*** -0.742*** -0.401*** 
 (0.0605) (0.0589) (0.0718) 
Trade with China (log) t-1 0.0284* 0.0214 0.0346 
 (0.0159) (0.0151) (0.0257) 
Energy depletion (log) t-1 0.000680 -0.000583 0.00325 
 (0.00287) (0.00282) (0.00530) 
Mineral depletion (log) t-1 0.00216 0.00132 -0.00331 
 (0.00258) (0.00320) (0.00493) 
Political Rights t-1 -0.000149 -0.00609 -0.0345 
 (0.0142) (0.0155) (0.0213) 
Control of corruption t-1 -0.0479 -0.0340 -0.0352 
 (0.0507) (0.0543) (0.118) 
GDP per capita (log) t-1 -0.0995*** -0.0940*** -0.167* 
 (0.0322) (0.0324) (0.0947) 
Population (log) t-1 -0.0428* -0.0285 0.300 
 (0.0255) (0.0237) (0.597) 
People affected by disasters (log) 0.00312 0.00281 0.00218 
 (0.00336) (0.00357) (0.00314) 
English language 0.124** 0.0999** omitted 
 (0.0482) (0.0443)  
Number of observations 655 655 655 
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.366 0.400 0.141 
Clustered standard errors Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Subregion dummies Yes Yes No 
Country fixed effects No No Yes 
Number of recipient codes 52 52 52 
Year dummies, region dummies and the constant terms are suppressed to save space. 
Significance levels: *:10%   **:5%   ***:1% 
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However, it is reasonable to expect that the marginal effect of DAC aid per capita on the 
probability of receiving Chinese aid may be different for changes at different initial levels of 
DAC aid per capita that a country receives. Figure 3 displays the average marginal effects of 
DAC aid on the probability of receiving Chinese aid at different log amounts of lagged DAC 
aid per capita together with the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The marginal effect 
of DAC aid on the probability of receiving Chinese aid is confirmed non-linear and the 
estimated effect is larger for increases at low levels of DAC aid per capita. Furthermore, the 
confidence intervals indicate that the calculated marginal effects are statistically significant at 
conventional levels for all different log amounts of DAC aid per capita in the country-year 
sample. As the Chinese aid to a recipient country is generally lower than the DAC aid, the result 
might indicate that it is more strategic and easier for China to respond in a competitive way in 
countries and years where the DAC increases its aid from relatively low initial levels.  
 
Figure 3. Probability of Chinese aid allocation- Marginal effects of log amount of DAC aid per capita 
 
The positive and statistically significant relationship between log amount of lagged DAC 
aid per capita and Chinese aid shown in Table 7, column 1, is robust to different choices of 
econometric models. The coefficient estimates for the pooled LPM presented in column 2 and 
the fixed effects estimation in column 3 can be compared with the average marginal effects 
presented for the probit estimation in column 1. One caveat of the LPM and fixed effects 
estimator is that the predictions are linear. Hence, the effects of lagged DAC aid on the 
probability that Chinese aid is allocated to the same country in the following year is predicted 
to be exactly the same for DAC aid changes at all initial amounts of DAC aid per capita, which 
Figure 3 has shown is not the case. The magnitude of the DAC aid per capita coefficient is 
slightly larger in the pooled LPM than in the pooled probit model, a one standard deviation 
increase in DAC aid per capita is associated with an increase in the probability of receiving 
Chinese aid by approximately 7.6 percentage points. As discussed in section 6.2, the inclusion 
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of country fixed effects is expected to significantly reduce the chances to identify a relationship 
between DAC aid and Chinese aid allocation. However, also with the inclusion of country fixed 
effects in the estimation presented in column 3, DAC aid per capita is a weak, but still 
statistically significant determinant of the probability of receiving Chinese aid, at the 10% 
significance level.  This is a reassuring finding as it indicates that the positive and statistically 
significant relationship between DAC aid allocation and Chinese aid allocation is not driven by 
country specific and time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. A one standard deviation 
increase in logged DAC aid per capita in the fixed effects estimation is translated into a 4.0 
percentage point increase in a country’s probability of receiving Chinese aid the following year.  
Presented in Table 8 are the coefficient estimates where the two continuous measures of 
Chinese aid in equation (2) are employed. Column 1 shows the result for the baseline 
specification with the log amount of Chinese aid per capita as dependent variable. The main 
variable of interest, log amount of lagged DAC aid per capita is again positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level. The positive correlation implies that a 1 percent 
increase in DAC aid per capita is associated with an increase in Chinese aid by approximately 
1.73 percent in the following year. In the fixed effects estimation in column 2, it is again 
reassuring to find that the coefficient estimate for DAC aid per capita is positive and that the 
effect is still statistically significant at conventional levels, now at the 10% significance level. 
Column 3 and 4 present the coefficient estimates when Chinese aid is measured as the 
number of Chinese aid projects. The results confirm the previous findings. The regression 
results for the baseline specification in column 3, indicate that the log amount of lagged DAC 
aid per capita is a highly significant determinant of the number of Chinese aid projects 
committed to a country in the following year. The estimated coefficient has a value of 0.574 
which implies that a one standard deviation increase in DAC aid per capita is associated with 
an increase in the number of Chinese aid projects by approximately 0.52 projects, which could 
be considered high as the mean and median recipient receives approximately two Chinese aid 
projects per year. Hence, a one standard deviation increase in DAC aid per capita can be 
translated to a 25 percent increase in the number of aid projects for the average aid recipient. 
The result is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects in column 4. The magnitude of the 
coefficient in the fixed effects estimation is 0.368, which implies an increase of approximately 
0.34 aid projects. The estimate is statistically significant at the 5% significance level.  
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Table 8. Continuous measures of Chinese aid- Coefficients Estimates 
Variables  Coefficients Variable Coefficients 
Chinese aid  (1) (2) #aid (3) (4) 
per capita (log) Pooled 
OLS 
FE (within) projects Pooled OLS FE (within) 
      
DAC aid per capita (log) t-1 1.727*** 1.232*  0.574*** 0.368** 
 (0.598) (0.629)  (0.147) (0.165) 
UNGA Voting t-1 4.186 3.491  1.362 1.187 
 (3.334) (3.660)  (1.100) (1.063) 
Taiwan recognition t-1 -7.964*** -3.495*  -1.812*** -1.134* 
 (1.255) (1.764)  (0.355) (0.664) 
Trade with China (log) t-1 0.665* 0.134  0.169 -0.0791 
 (0.381) (0.460)  (0.108) (0.158) 
Energy depletion (log) t-1 0.0417 0.0454  0.0167 0.0420** 
 (0.0655) (0.0648)  (0.0185) (0.0200) 
Mineral depletion (log) t-1 0.0340 -0.149  0.0503** -0.00425 
 (0.0659) (0.0976)  (0.0195) (0.0265) 
Political Rights t-1 0.225 0.174  0.120 0.158 
 (0.319) (0.507)  (0.0909) (0.131) 
Control of corruption t-1 -1.438 -0.715  -0.892** -0.182 
 (0.952) (2.117)  (0.363) (0.405) 
GDP per capita (log) t-1 -1.804** -1.517  -0.607*** -0.426 
 (0.678) (1.443)  (0.214) (0.529) 
Population (log) t-1 -0.663 13.86  -0.245 1.871 
 (0.533) (11.61)  (0.180) (3.192) 
People affected by disasters (log) -0.00996 -0.0444  0.00537 -0.00129 
 (0.0700) (0.0679)  (0.0180) (0.0194) 
English language 3.044** omitted  1.550*** omitted 
 (1.162)   (0.381)  
Number of observations 655 655  655 655 
R2 0.274 0.091  0.407 0.233 
Clustered standard errors Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Subregion dummies Yes No  Yes No 
Country fixed effects No Yes  No Yes 
Number of recipient codes 52 52  52 52 
Year dummies, region dummies and the constant terms are suppressed to save space. 
Significance levels: *:10%   **:5%   ***:1% 
 
In addition, one can note that the marginal effect and coefficient estimates for political ties 
with Taiwan is also able to maintain a negative and statistically significant relationship with 
Chinese aid when the fixed effects estimator is employed. It is however important to note that 
this effect is driven by a limited number of countries that have switched recognition from 
Taiwan to China in recent years. In line with previous findings by Dreher et al. (2015b), Li 
(2015) and Dreher and Fuchs (2016), the log of GDP per capita is found to be statistically 
significant and negatively correlated with all three measures of Chinese aid in the baseline 
regressions. The control for trade with China is positive and weakly significant in the baseline 
probit regression, Table 7, and in the pooled OLS models in Table 8. These results imply that 
countries trading more with China receive more Chinese aid, all else equal. In previous studies, 
Dreher et al. (2015b) have found trade with China to be a determinant of less concessional 
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Chinese aid flows, but not of traditional ODA aid flows. However, the statistically significant 
relationships do not survive in the fixed effects models. 
7.2  Cross-Country Additional Robustness Checks 
As additional robustness checks, equations (1) and (2) are re-estimated with the restricted 
country sample excluding Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland and Burkina Faso. These 
four countries have in common that they are the only African countries in the sample that did 
not receive any Chinese aid between the year 2000 and 2012 and they are the only countries 
that upheld diplomatic ties with Taiwan during the full time period. This study consider it 
unlikely that this is a random coincidence. A table of the regression results is presented in 
appendix A8. The estimated magnitude of the calculated marginal effect and coefficient 
estimates for the lagged log amount of DAC aid per capita are very similar to the estimates in 
the baseline regressions. Hence, the baseline results are robust to the exclusion of the four 
countries.  
In the last robustness checks the uncertainty about how fast China can respond to changes 
in DAC aid per capita allocation and whether a one year lag is appropriate is tested. The baseline 
regressions in equations (1) and (2) are now re-estimated without lagging DAC aid, in an 
attempt to test for an instant reaction, as well as with a two year time lag.  The regression results 
are presented in appendices A9 and A10. Appendix A9 presents the marginal effect and 
estimated coefficients for an instant Chinese reaction to the log amount of DAC aid per capita. 
The estimated magnitude is in general larger than in the baseline regressions with the one year 
lag and the calculated marginal effect and coefficients are significant at 1% significance level 
across all econometric models and specifications. Figure 4 displays the average marginal effects 
of DAC aid on the probability of receiving Chinese aid at different log amounts of lagged DAC 
aid per capita and the corresponding 95% confidence interval. Compared to Figure 3, the pattern 
is similar but the magnitude of the marginal effect is larger, hence changes in DAC aid has a 
larger effect on the probability of  receiving Chinese aid at low initial amounts of log DAC aid 
per capita. Appendix A10 presents the marginal effects and estimated coefficients when the log 
amount of DAC aid per capita enters the regressions with a two years lag. This time the 
estimated magnitude is in general much lower than in the baseline regressions and the 
regressions for instant reaction. Additionally, the coefficient estimates are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels in the fixed effects estimations. Figure 5 displays the average 
marginal effects of DAC aid on the probability of receiving Chinese aid at different amounts of 
log DAC aid per capita and the corresponding 95% confidence interval. 
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The results from this exercise implies that Chinese aid is flexible and responds quickly to 
changes in DAC aid allocation. However, when DAC aid does not enter the regressions with a 
time lag, the simultaneity problem is more alarming than in the baseline regressions.  Therefore,  
it is reasonable to introduce the lag, and the employment of a one year lag of DAC aid seems 
to be the most appropriate choice. 
Figure 4. Probability of Chinese aid allocation- Marginal effects of log amount of DAC aid per capita, instant reaction 
 
 
Figure 5. Probability of Chinese aid allocation- Marginal effects of log amount of DAC aid per capita, 2 years lag 
 
7.3 Cross-Country Heterogeneity Tests 
Table 9 presents the average marginal effects and coefficient estimates of the explanatory 
variable lagged log amount of DAC aid per capita in the five different heterogeneity tests 
outlined in section 6.3. In columns 1 and 2 the country-year sample is divided into one group 
of countries with confirmed oil endowments and another group with no oil endowments. Some 
of the early qualitative literature, presented in section 3, suggests that Chinese aid allocation is 
driven mainly by natural resource endowments. Therefore, the first heterogeneity test examines 
whether the Chinese aid allocation responds differently to DAC aid allocation if a country has 
oil endowments. The Chinese could potentially be less likely to coordinate when countries have 
oil endowments. The regression results gives no clear indication of  whether China’s response 
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to DAC aid differ for the two samples. When testing for a significant difference between the 
two groups, the effect is not found to be statistically different from each another for any of the 
three measures of Chinese aid18. 
Based on the discussion about China’s no strings-attached policy and its likely implications 
for coordination outcomes, countries are divided into democratic and non-democratic countries 
over the years in the second heterogeneity test. The results in columns 3 and 4 indicate that the 
Chinese aid allocation may follow DAC aid allocation more closely and hence be more 
competitive in non-democracies, while a similar pattern is not found in more democratic 
countries in column 3. However, the difference between democracies and non-democracies is 
only statistically significant when Chinese aid is measured as the number of Chinese aid 
projects. 
The third heterogeneity test divides the country-year sample into groups after corruption 
prevalence. The results in column 5 and 6 suggest little difference between the two groups and 
the difference is not statistically different from each other when employing any of the Chinese 
aid measures.  
Columns 7 and 8 show the results from the fourth heterogeneity test. Here, the sample is 
divided into two different time periods, before and after the year 2005. The reason why year 
2005 is employed as the threshold is because it is the year when the Paris Declaration was 
endorsed by the OECD DAC donors as well as the year when China, according to the White 
paper in 2011, started to cooperate with other bilateral and multilateral donors. This could 
suggest that China may have had stronger incentives to coordinate with other bilateral donors 
after the year 2005. However, the results shown in column 7 and 8 suggest that, from an aid 
effectiveness perspective, China has responded more competitively to DAC aid allocation in 
the period after 2005 and coordinated the aid effort worse. The difference is confirmed to be 
statistically different from each other at the 1% significance level in the regressions employing 
the continuous measures of Chinese aid, and it is a border case at the 10% significance level 
when the Chinese aid dummy is employed. 
The last heterogeneity test divides the country-year observations into two groups after a 
threshold where a country’s population lives on less than 1.25 US dollars per day in a year. This 
subsample is defined as low income in this test. According to Powell and Findley (2012), donor 
coordination should still be considered effective if the donor clustering is high in geographical 
areas where the need of aid is high. The division of the observations into a subsample of low 
                                                          
18 When testing for statistically different effects interaction terms between DAC aid and the variables defining 
the subgroups are employed in a regression of the full sample. The regression results are available upon request.   
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income country-years could therefore be used to test whether the positive correlation between 
DAC aid and Chinese aid is mainly driven by donor clustering in countries and years with high 
need.  
According to the results shown in columns 9 and 10, China does however seem to allocate 
its aid as additional to DAC aid per capita mainly in wealthier countries, rather than the other 
way around. The effect is confirmed to be statistically different from each other at the 5% 
significance level when employing both the binary indicator of Chinese aid and Chinese aid 
projects as the measures of the dependent variable. All else equal, low income countries receive 
more Chinese aid. However, if DAC aid per capita is increasing in low income countries, China 
is confirmed to respond with smaller increase in aid the following year than in wealthier 
countries. Hence, the results suggest an ineffective coordination between Chinese aid and DAC 
aid also using the definition of Powell and Findley (2012). 
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Table 9. Heterogeneity analyses- Marginal effect and estimated coefficients of DAC aid per capita for different subsamples 
Variables      Marginal effects      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Oil=1 Oil=0 Democracy=1 Democracy=0 Corruption=1 Corruption=0 year 2000-2005 year 2006-2012 Low income=1 Low income=0 
Chinese aid dummy           
Pooled Probit           
DAC aid per capita (log) t-1 0.192*** 0.0320 0.0135 0.101*** 0.0425* 0.0745*** 0.0686** 0.0743*** 0.043619 0.135*** 
 (0.0623) (0.0224) (0.0346) (0.0265) (0.0249) (0.0236) (0.0336) (0.0227) (0.0392) (0.0266) 
Chinese aid per capita (log)     Coefficients      
Pooled OLS           
DAC aid per capita (log) t-1 3.023*** 1.332** 0.118 2.335*** 1.832** 1.633*** 0.318 2.629*** 2.111*** 2.177*** 
 (0.955) (0.566) (0.870) (0.490) (0.836) (0.538) (0.655) (0.568) (0.782) (0.552) 
# Chinese projects     Coefficients      
Pooled OLS           
DAC aid per capita (log) t-1 0.802*** 0.437*** 0.289 0.615*** 0.497** 0.505*** 0.261* 0.765*** 0.353 0.906*** 
 (0.257) (0.152) (0.206) (0.147) (0.242) (0.133) (0.139) (0.174) (0.249)   (0.149) 
Observations 136 528 267 388 159 496 294 361 258 397 
Number of recipients 11 42 30 40 23 49 50 52 31 45 
Year dummies, region dummies, additional controls and the constant terms are suppressed to save space. Robust standard errors (not clustered) in parenthesis.  
Significance levels: *:10%   **:5%   ***: 1%  
                                                          
19 The number of observations is reduced to 205 due to a number of years and regions that predict Chinese aid perfectly.  
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7.4 Within-Country Sector level Regression Results  
Let us now turn to the second research question, at the within-country sector level. Table 10 
presents the coefficient estimates for the lagged log amount of DAC aid in the within-country 
sector analysis, see equation (3) in section 6.1. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates 
cannot be interpreted directly, but the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients can be 
interpreted. The coefficient estimates are positive in both the probit model, column 1, and in 
the logit model, column 2, but the estimates are far from being statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Column 3 presents the coefficient estimate for the conditional fixed effects 
logit model, the estimate for log amount of DAC aid per capita is again positive and statistically 
insignificant. This may suggest that the simple probit and logit estimations do not suffer from 
severe bias, but the regression results presented in Table 10 are in any case not informative 
regarding the relationship between the allocation of DAC aid and Chinese aid at the within-
country sector level. Compared to the indications of Chinese competition and duplication 
behavior at the country level, a similar behavior cannot be confirmed within countries. 
Table 10. Coefficient estimates, Within-country sector analysis 
Variables   Coefficients  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Probit Logit fe Logit 
Chinese aid dummy    
Amount of DAC aid (log) t-1 0.0264 0.0423 0.0384 
 (0.0222) (0.0407) (0.0426) 
Number of Observations20 2,171 2,171 2,171 
Number of country-sector pairs 167 167 167 
Year dummies   Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Yes Yes No 
Pseudo R2 0.303 0.301  
Year dummies, country-sector dummies and the constant terms are suppressed to save space. 
Robust standard errors clustered on recipient country-sector pairs in parenthesis for probit and logit.  
Significance levels: *:10%   **:5%   ***:1% 
 
In a robustness check, the sample is restricted to include only the three largest sectors; 
Social infrastructure & Services, Economic infrastructure & Services and Productive Sectors. 
The regression results, presented in appendix A11, give again no indications of a statistically 
significant relationship between within-country DAC aid allocation and the Chinese aid 
allocation. 
In an additional test the DAC aid variable enters equation (3) without the time lag in an 
attempt to test for an instant Chinese reaction. The regression results from this exercise again 
                                                          
20 The sample size is reduced to 2171 country-sector-year observations due to the fact that 121 of the country-
sector pairs predict the dependent variable perfectly.  
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confirm the statistically insignificant within-country relationship between DAC aid and 
Chinese aid21. 
One drawback of the econometric specification in equation (3) is that it cannot distinguish 
between the included sectors. Hence, if there is a relationship between DAC aid allocation and 
Chinese aid allocation only within a certain sector, equation (3) cannot make such separate 
predictions. Therefore, separate regressions for the Social infrastructure & Services, Economic 
infrastructure & Services and Productive Sectors are performed in a heterogeneity  test of 
potentially different responses of Chinese aid on DAC aid allocation in different sectors. The 
probit and logit specifications control for year fixed effects and country fixed effects through 
the inclusion of dummy variables. The results are presented in appendix A12, and once again, 
the regression results fail to identify a relationship between DAC aid and Chinese aid sector 
priorities as all coefficient estimates are insignificant across all econometric models. Hence, the 
results presented in this section do not suggest a systematic relationship between DAC and 
Chinese aid allocation at the sector level within countries. One obvious reason for this could be 
that in reality, there is no relationship to identify at the within-country sector level. Other 
potential reasons will be discussed in the following section.  
8. Analysis and Discussion  
Aid fragmentation and lack of donor coordination are two confirmed sources of increased 
transaction costs and increased administrative burden in aid recipient countries with reduced 
aid effectiveness as an unpleasant outcome (Acharya et al., 2006; Anderson, 2011; Bigsten & 
Tengstam, 2015). The traditional DAC donor community has struggled to improve on these 
issues since the endorsement of the Paris Declaration in 2005, but China, purportedly the most 
important bilateral donor outside the DAC, has not signed on the Paris Declaration as an aid 
donor which has induced uncertainty about China’s interest to either compete or cooperate with 
the existing DAC donor community.  
The empirical results from the cross-country regressions provide support for a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between DAC aid allocation and Chinese aid allocation, 
where China responds to DAC aid allocation with addition aid flows. When putting this finding 
for research question 1 into the perspective outlined in the theoretical framework, the results 
give clear indications of a cross-country competition between DAC aid allocation and Chinese 
aid allocation over the same recipient countries. This competition has made Chinese aid mainly 
                                                          
21 Regression results are available upon request  
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additional to DAC aid in recipient countries, i.e. if the traditional DAC donors increases its aid 
engagement in a country China will most likely do the same. The idea that the demand driven 
nature of Chinese aid would indirectly induce aid to be allocated in response to a higher demand 
for Chinese aid in recipient countries where DAC aid is not sufficient or not available can 
therefore be rejected. Chinese aid is instead allocated in addition to and in competition with 
DAC aid at the country level, which suggests unfavorable donor coordination from the 
perspective of aid effectiveness. According to Powell and Findley (2012), donor coordination 
should, however, still be considered effective if the donor clustering is high in geographical 
areas where the need of aid is high. Unfortunately, the idea that Chinese aid flows could be 
additional to DAC aid flows due to the recognition of particularly high recipient need is rejected 
in the heterogeneity test, which shows that the positive correlation between DAC aid allocation 
and Chinese aid allocation is mainly driven by allocation to wealthier countries rather than the 
other way around.  
 The empirical results suggest that, when the conventional explanatory variables in the 
Chinese aid allocation literature are controlled for, there is room for China to also take the DAC 
aid allocation into account and this study confirms the competitive allocation outcome found 
and discussed in Hernandez (2015). It is however important to acknowledge that the empirical 
strategies employed for this study cannot rule out that the competitive allocation outcome could 
be driven by omitted variables bias or country specific shocks that attracted both Chinese aid 
and DAC aid at the same time. The results in this study can also confirm previous findings in 
the Chinese aid allocation literature, which suggest that the determinants of DAC aid and 
Chinese aid allocation are similar, mainly driven by political interest and need in recipient 
countries (Dreher et al., 2015b; Li, 2015; Dreher & Fuchs, 2016). If Chinese aid and DAC aid 
allocation are mainly driven by the same determinants, the competitive allocation outcome 
across countries is not unexpected.  
In this discussion, it is important to note that the DAC donors have not been able to 
coordinate themselves in a desirable way. Bigsten and Tengstam (2015) suggest that political 
motivations behind donors aid allocation prevent desirable aid allocation outcomes. Donors 
seem to favor a global presence and they want to allocate to a broader range of countries 
according to political and economic interests. Especially larger donors are expected to be 
particularly keen on giving aid to all countries at the same time. Hence, it seems reasonable to 
believe that this motivation is also applicable to Chinese aid allocation. When the bilateral DAC 
donors are increasing their engagement in recipient countries, China may respond in a 
competitive manner to prevent a loss of influence and goodwill in the same countries. China 
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has established FOCAC, which may be the most important multilateral platform for dialogue 
and cooperation with its allies in Africa. The results in this study suggest that decisions about 
China’s aid allocation favor a good relation with their African allies over a closer relationship 
with the DAC donor community. All African countries that maintain diplomatic ties with China 
have received Chinese aid during the period 2000-2012, while Burkina Faso, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Swaziland and Gambia, who all recognized Taiwan during the time period, have not 
received any Chinese aid. Excluding these countries from the empirical analysis does not alter 
the regression results but it gives a clear indication of the importance of international 
recognition in the Chinese aid allocation process..  
The heterogeneity tests performed in this study do not indicate that the Chinese response 
to DAC aid allocation is different in natural resource rich countries or in countries with high 
corruption prevalence. Furthermore, the Chinese response to DAC aid in democracies versus 
non-democracies is ambiguous and hence there is little reason to believe that Chinese aid, due 
to its demand driven nature and the no strings-attached policy, is indirectly allocated in a more 
competitive way to less democratic countries where the governments might find the Chinese 
aid particularly attractive. The anecdotal evidence of Chinese “rogue aid” and search for natural 
resources in the early qualitative literature seem to be only anecdotal evidence, rather than the 
general outcome. On the other hand, the heterogeneity tests revealed that the Chinese aid 
allocation has been more competitive in response to DAC aid allocation in the period 2006-
2012 than in the earlier period, 2000-2005. This suggests that the initiation of Chinese 
cooperation with other multilateral and bilateral donors in 2005 has not encouraged a better 
coordination between China and the traditional DAC donor community.  
If the empirical investigation of the relationship between DAC aid and Chinese aid 
allocation at the country level provides robust support of a competitive allocation to the same 
recipient countries, the results from the within-country sector investigation are less informative. 
The regression results do not show any systematic relationship between Chinese within-country 
sector allocation and DAC aid sector allocation. The empirical investigation fails to find 
statistically significant results irrespective of the choice of empirical strategy. In the theoretical 
framework, the demand driven nature of Chinese aid suggests that Chinese aid might be 
indirectly targeted to sectors neglected by the DAC donors or where DAC aid is insufficient, 
for example in infrastructure and productive sectors. However, the results in this study cannot 
confirm or reject such a relationship. What is found, however, is that China’s motivation to 
cover a wide range of countries and compete with the DAC aid allocation at the country level 
is not as apparent when investigating allocation at the sector level within recipient countries.  
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There are a number of possible reasons why a relationship between DAC aid allocation 
and Chinese aid allocation cannot be found within countries at the sector level. One obvious 
reason is that in reality, there is no existing relationship to identify at the within-country sector 
level, maybe because sector aid is simply more ad hoc than the more politically motivated 
country level allocation.  
A second reason may be due to an inappropriate choice of empirical strategy in this study. 
There are very few previous studies investigating the relationship between different donors’ 
within-country sector allocation that could be used as empirical guidance.  
A third reason why this study fails to identify a relationship may be due to the choice of 
sector aggregation. This study considered sectors at the aggregate level, as a consequence, 
sector categories include a number of subsectors which may differ in their effect. The 
aggregation of the sector Economic infrastructure & Services, for example, includes energy 
generation, banking and transport & storage. The aggregation of the sector Productive Sectors 
includes agriculture, mining and construction, but also trade policy & tourism. This choice of 
aggregation may have been unsuitable and further research about the relationship between 
Chinese and DAC aid sector allocation should definitely consider different sector 
categorizations to test whether a relationship between within-country sector allocation of DAC 
aid and Chinese aid exist or not.   
Under the assumption that China is more likely to be the most responsive donor, the results 
from the cross-country and within-country empirical investigation in this study find no evidence 
in favor of a Chinese interest to coordinate with the traditional DAC donors. The findings 
suggest that China does not respond to the presence of bilateral DAC aid in a well-coordinated 
way. However, if the assumption that China is the most responsive donor is not valid, the bad 
donor coordination may be the unfavorable outcome of a simultaneous aid betting game 
between China and the traditional DAC donors.  
To summarize the main findings of this study, China respond to increasing DAC aid with 
additional aid in a competitive way at the country level. Chinese aid and DAC aid are competing 
with each other over the same recipient countries and the competition has been more apparent 
after the year 2005 as well as in wealthier countries. Returning back to the definition matrix in 
section 3, Table 2, the results are in favor of the relationship definitions in the upper panel 
where Chinese aid and DAC aid allocation is better described as competing with each other. 
Due to the fact that the within-country sector results do not provide a clear answer to research 
question 2, it is therefore impossible to decide whether the upper right or upper left box in the 
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definition matrix provide the most appropriate definition of the relationship between DAC aid 
and Chinese aid allocation.  
Even if the results of this study cannot fully confirm whether Chinese aid is allocated in 
competition with or as a complement to DAC sector allocation, the knowledge about the 
significant cross-country competition still provides important insights for policy. As the DAC 
donors themselves are struggling to coordinate their aid more effectively, China is now an 
additional player to the DAC donors swarming in some countries. According to the analysis 
and the discussion in this section, it seems unlikely that China would cut aid to their African 
allies and risk their influence and goodwill. On the other hand it seems equally unlikely that 
any of the big bilateral DAC donors would cut their aid to leave room for China. Even if the 
aid flows on average target the same recipient countries, the coordination problem is less 
problematic if China’s aid and DAC aid target different sectors within countries. From the 
perspective of aid effectiveness, it is therefore important that the DAC donor community and 
China collaborate on the “ground” within recipient countries in an attempt to reduce the risk of 
project duplications. With the knowledge that the Chinese embassies in aid recipient countries 
play an important role in the Chinese aid management system, a close dialogue between the 
DAC community and the Chinese embassy personnel could be a way forward if the bilateral 
DAC donors themselves are not willing to adjust to Chinese allocation priorities.    
9. Conclusion 
The recent rise of China as a global aid donor has induced a discussion about whether China 
will compete with or complement aid flows from the existing DAC donor community. 
Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate whether Chinese aid allocation takes the 
presence of bilateral DAC aid into account in its aid allocation process, and identify the 
relationship between actual aid allocation of Chinese aid and DAC aid in a two-level cross-
country and within-country sectoral framework.  
After accounting for a number of controls effecting Chinese aid allocation, this study is 
able to confirm a robust, positive and statistically significant relationship between Chinese aid 
allocation and DAC aid allocation across recipient countries in the African continent between 
the year 2000 and 2012. China does not respond to the presence of bilateral DAC aid in a well-
coordinated way. Instead the response to increasing DAC aid is competition and additional 
Chinese aid flows to the same countries.  
The result is robust to the choice of different econometric models and specifications and 
surprisingly also when the fixed effects estimator is employed, which assures that the result is 
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not driven by any country specific time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The most 
aggravating factor for the result of this study is the simultaneity issue. There are obvious reasons 
to suspect that reverse causality may be a source of endogeneity if the DAC donors are better 
informed about Chinese aid commitments and more flexible and responsive in their allocation 
decisions than what is assumed in this study. However, even without a strong case of causality, 
the simple positive correlation between Chinese aid allocation and DAC aid allocation is still 
interesting in the lights of donor coordination and aid effectiveness, and hence the importance 
of causality may be of second order. In the discussion about the possible mechanisms explaining 
why Chinese aid is allocated in competition with DAC aid, this study considers it likely that 
China is more interested in an aid allocation which favors a good relationship with its African 
allies rather than a closer relationship with the DAC donor community. Hence, when the 
bilateral DAC donors are increasing their engagement in recipient countries China respond in 
a competitive manner to prevent a loss of influence and goodwill in the same countries.  
While this study can confirm that the two aid sources appear to be in competition with each 
other over the same countries, the relationship at the sector level within countries is less straight 
forward. The results of this study cannot confirm any relationship between the two aid flows 
within countries. As this is one of the first studies that investigates the relationship between aid 
flows to sectors within countries, more research regarding this topic needs to be performed. In 
future research it might be possible to find better strategies to investigate if there is a 
relationship between DAC aid and Chinese aid allocation at sector level within countries. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to exploit the georeferenced aid data available to 
investigate if there is a geographic relationship between DAC aid allocation and Chinese 
allocation also within countries at the regional level. Even if Chinese aid flows and DAC aid 
flows on average target the same recipient countries as suggested by the findings of this study, 
the coordination problem is less problematic if Chinese aid and DAC aid target different sectors 
and regions within countries. Therefore, one of the most important insight from this study might 
be the need for collaboration efforts between DAC and China in aid recipient countries to 
mitigate the worst coordination problems. 
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Appendix  
A1. List of recipient countries covered in this study 
Recipient name UN Region Years covered Recipient name UN Region Years covered  
Algeria Northern Africa 2000-2012 Liberia Western Africa 2000-2012 
Angola Middle Africa 2000-2012 Libya Northern Africa 2004-2012 
Benin Western Africa 2000-2012 Madagascar Eastern Africa 2000-2012 
Botswana Southern Africa 2000-2012 Malawi Eastern Africa 2000-2012 
Burkina Faso Western Africa 2000-2012 Mali Western Africa  2000-2012 
Burundi Eastern Africa 2000-2012 Mauritania Western Africa  2000-2012 
Cameroon Middle Africa 2000-2012 Mauritius Eastern Africa 2000-2012 
Cape Verde Western Africa 2000-2012 Morocco Northern Africa 2000-2012 
Central African Republic Middle Africa 2000-2012 Mozambique Eastern Africa 2000-2012 
Chad Middle Africa 2000-2012 Namibia Southern Africa 2000-2012 
Comoros Eastern Africa 2000-2012 Niger Western Africa 2000-2012 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Middle Africa 2000-2012 Nigeria Western Africa 2000-2012 
Republic of the Congo Middle Africa  2000-2012 Rwanda Eastern Africa 2000-2012 
Cote D'Ivoire Western Africa 2000-2012 Sao Tome & Principe Middle Africa 2000-2012 
Djibouti Eastern Africa 2000-2012 Senegal Western Africa 2000-2012 
Egypt Northern Africa 2000-2012 Seychelles Eastern Africa 2000-2012 
Equatorial Guinea Middle Africa 2000-2012 Sierra Leone Western Africa 2000-2012 
Eritrea Eastern Africa 2000-2012 South Africa Southern Africa 2000-2012 
Ethiopia Eastern Africa 2000-2012 Sudan Northern Africa 2000-2012 
Gabon Middle Africa 2000-2012 Swaziland Southern Africa 2000-2012 
Gambia Western Africa 2000-2012 Tanzania Eastern Africa 2000-2012 
Ghana Western Africa 2000-2012 Togo Western Africa 2000-2012 
Guinea Western Africa 2000-2012 Tunisia Northern Africa 2000-2012 
Guinea-Bissau Western Africa 2000-2012 Uganda Eastern Africa 2000-2012 
Kenya Eastern Africa 2000-2012 Zambia Eastern Africa 2000-2012 
Lesotho Southern Africa 2000-2012 Zimbabwe Eastern Africa 2000-2012 
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A2. List of sectors countries covered in this study 
Sector name  Including aid to 
Social infrastructure & Services Education, Health, Population policies, Water & Sanitation, Government & Civil Society 
Economic infrastructure & Services Transport & Storage, Communication, Energy generation & supply, Banking, Business & Financial services, 
Productive Sectors Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Industry, Mineral resources & Mining, Construction, Trade policy & Tourism 
Multisector/Cross-cutting General environmental protection, other multisector (Urban and Rural development e.g.) 
Other Commodity aid  Development food aid/Food security assistance, Other commodity assistance 
General Budget Support General budget support 
 
 
A3. List of Bilateral DAC members 
  
Australia Korea 
Austria Luxembourg 
Belgium The Netherlands 
Canada New Zeeland 
Czech Republic Norway 
Denmark Poland 
European Union Portugal 
Finland Slovak Republic 
France Slovenia 
Germany Spain 
Greece Sweden 
Iceland Switzerland 
Ireland United Kingdom 
Italy United States  
Japan  
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A4. Variables, definitions and sources 
Variables    Description      Data source    
 
Chinese aid (binary)   Binary variable=1 if receiving Chinese aid   AidData (Strange et al. 2015a) 
     and =0 otherwise  
Chinese aid (log)     Amount of ODA per capita, in US$    AidData  (Strange et al. 2015a) 
Chinese aid (level)   Number of ODA projects     AidData (Strange et al. 2015a) 
Chinese Sector aid (binary)  Binary variable=1 if receiving Chinese aid   AidData (Strange et al. 2015a) 
     and =0 otherwise  
DAC aid (log)     Amount of ODA per capita, in US$, lagged   OECD (2016) 
DAC Sector aid (log)    Amount of ODA, in US$ , lagged    OECD (2016) 
GDP per capita (log)     GDP per capita, lagged     World Bank (2015) 
Population (log)    Total population size, lagged     World Bank (2015) 
Total affected from disasters (log)  Total number of people affected from natural disasters  EM-DAT (2015) 
Trade with China (log)  Bilateral trade (exports plus imports) with China  UN Comtrade via WITS (2016) 
in US$, lagged       
Energy depletion ((log)  Adjusted savings: energy depletion, lagged   World Bank (2015) 
Mineral depletion ((log)  Adjusted savings: mineral depletion, lagged   World Bank (2015) 
Proved oil reserves (log) Proved oil reserves on barrels, lagged   BP (2015) 
UN voting with China  Voting alignment in the UN General Assembly   Access from Axel Dreher and Andreas Fuchs  
all votes, lagged        
Taiwan recognition Binary variable=1 if country have diplomatic relations Rich (2011)  
with Taiwan and =0 otherwise, lagged 
Democracy dummy Binary variable=1 if electoral democracy    Freedom House (2015)  
and =0 otherwise, lagged 
Control of corruption  Control of Corruption index ranging from -2.5  Worldwide Governance Indicators (2015) 
 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better    
 governance, lagged 
Political rights Political rights index ranging from 1 to 7 with 1   Freedom House (2015) 
representing the least free and 7 the most free 
political rights, lagged 
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A5. Descriptive Statistics for corruption variable before and after interpolation  
 
 
 
A6. Log of Chinese aid and DAC aid over time by recipient country, 2000-2012 
 
 
 
Variables Obs Mean Median Std.dev Min Max 
Control of Corruption- original 568 -0.579 -0.650 0.563 -1.706 1.250 
Control of Corruption-interpolated 670 -0.574 -0.649 0.564 -1.733 1.250 
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A7. Pairwise correlation of all explanatory variables 
 DAC aid 
per capita 
Political 
Rights 
Trade with 
China 
Population GDP per 
capita 
Energy 
depletion 
Mineral 
depletion 
Control of 
corruption 
Taiwan 
recognition 
UNGA 
voting 
People affected 
by disasters 
English 
dummy 
DAC aid per capita  1.0000            
Political Rights 0.3681 1.0000            
Trade with China -0.1819 -0.1721 1.0000           
Population -0.4956 -0.2144 0.5539  1.0000          
GDP per capita 0.2251 0.0853 0.3760  -0.3287 1.0000         
Energy depletion -0.2168 -0.3019 0.6229  0.4564 0.3899 1.0000        
Mineral depletion -0.0523 -0.0775 0.5327  0.5567 0.0550 0.3508 1.0000       
Control of corruption 0.3330 0.5645 -0.1602  -0.2751 0.3521 -0.2131 -0.0357 1.0000      
Taiwan recognition 0.0410 -0.0010 -0.3206  -0.2220 -0.1304 -0.1631 -0.2872 0.0565 1.0000     
UNGA voting -0.0259 0.0997 0.3656  0.3015 0.1130 0.1815 0.2803 0.2057 -0.2227 1.0000    
People affected by disasters -0.1841 -0.0056 0.2061  0.4615 -0.2920 0.0586 0.2614 -0.1757 -0.0656 0.0782  1.0000  
English dummy -0.0107 0.1984 -0.0144 0.0406 -0.0062 -0.1772 -0.0381 0.2811 0.0451 -0.0278   0.0476    1.0000 
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A8. Robustness check- Marginal effect and coefficient estimates excluding Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland and Burkina Faso 
Variable  Marginal effect Coefficients Variable  Coefficients Variable Coefficients 
Binary indicator (2) (4) (5) Chinese aid  (2) (3) #aid (5) (6) 
Chinese aid Pooled Probit Pooled LPM LPM FE (within) per capita (log) Pooled OLS FE (within) projects Pooled LPM FE (within) 
          
DAC aid per capita (log) t-1 0.0776*** 0.0806*** 0.0448*  1.730** 1.304*  0.551*** 0.396** 
 (0.0209) (0.0232) (0.0247)  (0.654) (0.681)  (0.160) (0.176) 
UNGA Voting t-1 0.0647 0.111 0.0401  5.070 4.048  1.431 1.307 
 (0.131) (0.139) (0.172)  (3.723) (4.170)  (1.238) (1.169) 
Taiwan recognition t-1 -0.482*** -0.617*** -0.383***  -5.864*** -3.153*  -1.459** -0.980 
 (0.0745) (0.0855) (0.0732)  (2.058) (1.719)  (0.661) (0.663) 
Trade with China (log) t-1 0.0298* 0.0236 0.0388  0.719* -0.0201  0.198* -0.169 
 (0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0287)  (0.399) (0.535)  (0.108) (0.174) 
Energy depletion (log) t-1 -0.0000528 -0.000667 0.00286  0.0477 0.0464  0.0174 0.0470** 
 (0.00318) (0.00316) (0.00562)  (0.0702) (0.0721)  (0.0194) (0.0184) 
Mineral depletion (log) t-1 0.00217 0.00139 -0.00500  0.0160 -0.182*  0.0475** -0.0183 
 (0.00276) (0.00334) (0.00486)  (0.0636) (0.0969)  (0.0196) (0.0251) 
Political Rights t-1 -0.00160 -0.00365 -0.0412*  0.0905 0.147  0.117 0.134 
 (0.0166) (0.0182) (0.0226)  (0.386) (0.555)  (0.113) (0.140) 
Control of corruption t-1 -0.0471 -0.0371 -0.0428  -1.504 -0.815  -0.884** -0.215 
 (0.0568) (0.0592) (0.123)  (1.016) (2.227)  (0.391) (0.406) 
GDP per capita (log) t-1 -0.108*** -0.106*** -0.206**  -1.920** -2.169  -0.678*** -0.661 
 (0.0343) (0.0366) (0.0976)  (0.760) (1.493)  (0.227) (0.525) 
Population (log) t-1 -0.0525* -0.0445 0.498  -0.885 18.56  -0.328 3.651 
 (0.0269) (0.0279) (0.612)  (0.629) (12.13)  (0.196) (2.960) 
People affected by disasters (log) 0.00339 0.00288 0.00252  -0.00281 -0.0478  0.00797 -0.00115 
 (0.00363) (0.00381) (0.00340)  (0.0746) (0.0744)  (0.0190) (0.0207) 
English language 0.141*** 0.116** omitted  3.425** omitted  1.677*** omitted 
 (0.0530) (0.0501)   (1.291)   (0.404)  
Number of Observations 605 605 605  605 605  605 605 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.247 0.254 0.151  0.206 0.098  0.372 0.251 
Clustered standard errors Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Subregion dummies Yes Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
Country fixed effects No No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Number of recipient codes 48 48 48  48 48  48 48 
Year dummies, region dummies and the constant terms are suppressed to save space. 
Significance levels: *:10%   **:5%   ***:1% 
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A9. Robustness check- Marginal effect and coefficient estimates without lagging DAC aid per capita, test for instant reaction 
Variable  Marginal effect Coefficients Variable  Coefficients Variable Coefficients 
Binary indicator (2) (4) (5) Chinese aid  (2) (3) #aid (5) (6) 
Chinese aid Pooled Probit Pooled LPM LPM FE (within) per capita (log) Pooled OLS FE (within) projects Pooled LPM FE (within) 
          
DAC aid per capita (log) 0.0959*** 0.102*** 0.0769***  2.105*** 1.738***  0.602*** 0.364*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0250) (0.0255)  (0.615) (0.622)  (0.154) (0.124) 
UNGA Voting t-1 0.0168 0.0708 0.0564  4.185 3.542  1.395 1.194 
 (0.123) (0.136) (0.151)  (3.199) (3.555)  (1.110) (1.075) 
Taiwan recognition t-1 -0.586*** -0.738*** -0.394***  -7.873*** -3.415*  -1.790*** -1.160* 
 (0.0588) (0.0577) (0.0669)  (1.238) (1.825)  (0.348) (0.692) 
Trade with China (log) t-1 0.0283* 0.0215 0.0334  0.668* 0.111  0.171 -0.0823 
 (0.0156) (0.0150) (0.0255)  (0.373) (0.455)  (0.106) (0.161) 
Energy depletion (log) t-1 -0.000143 -0.00120 0.00253  0.0291 0.0290  0.0141 0.0386* 
 (0.00288) (0.00289) (0.00542)  (0.0663) (0.0653)  (0.0187) (0.0202) 
Mineral depletion (log) t-1 0.00207 0.00136 -0.00338  0.0352 -0.145  0.0526** -0.000569 
 (0.00260) (0.00320) (0.00487)  (0.0646) (0.0941)  (0.0199) (0.0273) 
Political Rights t-1 -0.00425 -0.00985 -0.0399*  0.149 0.0723  0.108 0.145 
 (0.0143) (0.0157) (0.0212)  (0.329) (0.530)  (0.0876) (0.133) 
Control of corruption t-1 -0.0594 -0.0408 -0.0515  -1.575 -0.980  -0.897** -0.191 
 (0.0527) (0.0556) (0.114)  (0.972) (1.980)  (0.361) (0.387) 
GDP per capita (log) t-1 -0.0935*** -0.0886*** -0.146  -1.694** -1.069  -0.595*** -0.348 
 (0.0313) (0.0328) (0.0934)  (0.692) (1.484)  (0.214) (0.539) 
Population (log) t-1 -0.0334 -0.0205 0.460  -0.503 16.68  -0.233 2.100 
 (0.0251) (0.0236) (0.588)  (0.523) (11.56)  (0.182) (3.395) 
People affected by disasters (log) 0.00262 0.00255 0.00183  -0.0154 -0.0528  0.00404 -0.00325 
 (0.00315) (0.00347) (0.00308)  (0.0707) (0.0697)  (0.0181) (0.0197) 
English language 0.125** 0.0969** omitted  2.984** omitted  1.536*** omitted 
 (0.0486) (0.0454)   (1.159)   (0.379)  
Number of Observations 655 655 655  655 655  655 655 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.378 0.408 0.149  0.283 0.099  0.409 0.233 
Clustered standard errors Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Subregion dummies Yes Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
Country fixed effects No No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Number of recipient codes 52 52 52  52 52  52 52 
Year dummies, region dummies and the constant terms are suppressed to save space. 
Significance levels: *:10%   **:5%   ***:1% 
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A10. Robustness check- Marginal effect and coefficient estimates when using a 2 years lag of DAC aid per capita 
Variable  Marginal effect Coefficients Variable Coefficients Variable Coefficients 
Binary indicator (2) (4) (5) Chinese aid  (2) (3) #aid (5) (6) 
Chinese aid Pooled Probit Pooled LPM LPM FE (within) per capita (log) Pooled OLS FE (within) projects Pooled LPM FE (within) 
          
DAC aid per capita (log) t-2 0.0549*** 0.0454*** 0.00850  0.702** 0.226  0.258** 0.120 
 (0.0180) (0.0106) (0.00770)  (0.324) (0.195)  (0.123) (0.0853) 
UNGA Voting t-1 0.00135 0.0882 0.0521  4.636 3.444  1.502 1.172 
 (0.127) (0.144) (0.157)  (3.482) (3.705)  (1.137) (1.084) 
Taiwan recognition t-1 -0.602*** -0.746*** -0.415***  -8.037*** -3.897**  -1.836*** -1.238* 
 (0.0620) (0.0598) (0.0684)  (1.244) (1.689)  (0.364) (0.668) 
Trade with China (log) t-1 0.0276* 0.0211 0.0344  0.666* 0.130  0.169 -0.0854 
 (0.0160) (0.0152) (0.0257)  (0.385) (0.456)  (0.112) (0.159) 
Energy depletion (log) t-1 0.00114 2.29e-05 0.00337  0.0565 0.0485  0.0214 0.0436** 
 (0.00286) (0.00280) (0.00529)  (0.0666) (0.0656)  (0.0183) (0.0201) 
Mineral depletion (log) t-1 0.00224 0.00177 -0.00238  0.0520 -0.123  0.0554*** 0.00263 
 (0.00262) (0.00329) (0.00497)  (0.0650) (0.0920)  (0.0204) (0.0268) 
Political Rights t-1 0.00256 -0.00157 -0.0316  0.350 0.257  0.158 0.178 
 (0.0141) (0.0151) (0.0213)  (0.314) (0.519)  (0.0958) (0.134) 
Control of corruption t-1 -0.0411 -0.0239 -0.0189  -1.094 -0.250  -0.791** -0.0565 
 (0.0492) (0.0531) (0.118)  (0.941) (2.259)  (0.359) (0.427) 
GDP per capita (log) t-1 -0.107*** -0.100*** -0.173*  -2.007*** -1.692  -0.667*** -0.478 
 (0.0327) (0.0339) (0.0977)  (0.725) (1.516)  (0.236) (0.550) 
Population (log) t-1 -0.0521* -0.0436* 0.176  -1.080* 10.33  -0.373* 0.943 
 (0.0266) (0.0254) (0.586)  (0.556) (11.22)  (0.203) (3.257) 
People affected by disasters (log) 0.00336 0.00323 0.00224  -0.00233 -0.0429  0.00800 0.0000485 
 (0.00339) (0.00367) (0.00311)  (0.0731) (0.0683)  (0.0192) (0.0195) 
English language 0.125*** 0.103** omitted  3.111** omitted  1.571*** omitted 
 (0.0484) (0.0447)   (1.188)   (0.383)  
Number of Observations 655 655 655  655 655  655 655 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.361 0.396 0.137  0.263 0.083  0.395 0.227 
Clustered standard errors Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Subregion dummies Yes Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
Country fixed effects No No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Number of recipient codes 52 52 52  52 52  52 52 
Year dummies, region dummies and the constant terms are suppressed to save space. 
Significance levels: *:10%   **:5%   ***:1%
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A11. Coefficient Estimates for restricted sample including only Social infrastructure & 
Services, Economic infrastructure & Services and Productive Sectors , Within-country sector 
analysis 
Variables  Coefficient estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Probit Logit fe Logit 
Chinese aid dummy    
DAC aid (log) t-1 0.0207 0.0329 0.0296 
 (0.0295) (0.0531) (0.0504) 
Number of Observations 1,651 1,651 1,651 
Number of country-sector pairs 127 127 127 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Yes Yes No 
Pseudo R2 0.289 0.288  
Year dummies, country-sector dummies and the constant terms are suppressed to save space. 
Robust standard errors clustered on recipient country-sector pairs in parenthesis for probit and logit.  
Significance levels: *:10%   **:5%   ***:1% 
 
 
A12. Coefficient Estimates, Sector analysis 
  Coefficient estimates  
Probit  Social infrastructure & 
Services 
Economic infrastructure & 
Services 
Productive 
Sectors 
Amount of DAC aid (log) t-1 0.205 0.167 0.0913 
in Social Sectors (0.179) (0.192) (0.183) 
Amount of DAC aid (log) t-1 -0.00591 0.0174 -0.0196 
in Economic Sectors (0.0295) (0.0322) (0.0332) 
Amount of DAC aid (log) t-1 -0.0161 0.0438 -0.118 
in Productive Sectors (0.0799) (0.0827) (0.0981) 
Observations 585 546 520 
Logit   Coefficient estimates  
Amount of DAC aid (log) t-1 0.364 0.346 0.189 
in Social Sectors (0.315) (0.336) (0.316) 
Amount of DAC aid (log) t-1 -0.00476 0.0199 -0.0348 
in Economic Sectors (0.0472) (0.0599) (0.0584) 
Amount of DAC aid (log) t-1 -0.0302 0.0737 -0.217 
in Productive Sectors (0.139) (0.151) (0.178) 
Observations 585 546 520 
fe Logit  Coefficient estimates  
Amount of DAC aid (log) t-1 0.330 0.318 0.171 
in Social Sectors (0.244) (0.282) (0.297) 
Amount of DAC aid (log) t-1 -0.00495 0.0180 -0.0316 
in Economic Sectors (0.0484) (0.0592) (0.0599) 
Amount of DAC aid (log) t-1 -0.0273 0.0676 -0.199 
in Productive Sectors (0.116) (0.125) (0.139) 
Number of Observations 585 546 520 
Year dummies, country dummies and the constant terms are suppressed to save space. 
Robust standard errors clustered on recipient country in parenthesis for probit and logit.  
    Significance levels: *:10%   **:5%   ***:1% 
 
